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PUBLIC NUISANCE SUITS FOR THE CLIMATE JUSTICE 
MOVEMENT: THE RIGHT THING AND THE RIGHT 
TIME 
Randall S. Abate* 
Abstract: The climate justice movement seeks to provide relief to vulnerable 
communities that have been disproportionately affected by climate change impacts. Public 
nuisance litigation for climate change impacts is a new and growing field that could provide 
the legal and policy underpinnings to help secure a viable foundation for climate justice in 
the United States and internationally. By securing victories in the court system, these suits 
may succeed where the domestic environmental justice movement failed in seeking to merge 
environmental protection and human rights concerns into an actionable legal theory. This 
Article first examines the nature and scope of the climate change impacts that are affecting 
vulnerable populations throughout the world. It then traces the evolution of public nuisance 
claims for climate change impacts, discusses the Native Village of Kivalina v. Exxon Mobil 
Corp. case as a turning point in the evolution of these claims, and considers what obstacles 
remain on the path toward success for Kivalina and similar suits in the United States and 
abroad. The Kivalina case involves the right set of facts and legal theories to afford a remedy 
to victims who are disproportionately affected by climate change. Ultimately, the Kivalina 
litigation could help to institutionalize climate justice claims as part of the post-Kyoto 
Protocol framework by recognizing a private right to be free from climate change impacts 
that threaten the sustainability of vulnerable communities. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Climate change is here to stay. The questions of whether climate 
change is happening and what the international community can do to 
respond to it are no longer the predominant focus of domestic and 
international climate change law and policy discussions. The 
international community made significant progress in addressing the 
global climate change problem with the Kyoto Protocol,1 which 
                                                     
1. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
opened for signature Mar. 16, 1998, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148 (entered into force 
Feb. 16, 2005). 
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responded to the causes of global climate change with ambitious targets 
and timetables for the parties’ reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.2 
However, ratifying the Kyoto Protocol, a controversial and multi-
faceted instrument, was only the first step in tackling this daunting and 
omnipresent global crisis. The international community is now 
confronting an indefinite “period of consequences”3 from climate change 
impacts. Accordingly, the new question at the forefront of the climate 
change policy debate in the post-Kyoto era4 is what legal remedies will 
be most effective to mitigate and adapt to these impacts.5 
In the context of climate change adaptation, the climate justice 
movement has emerged as a mechanism to address the rights of the 
victims of climate change impacts.6 Climate justice embraces a human 
rights approach to advocating for rights and remedies for climate 
change.7 Rather than focusing on the climate change phenomenon itself, 
climate justice focuses on the rights of those disproportionately affected 
by the impacts of climate change.8 The challenge in seeking to 
                                                     
2. Id., art. 3. 
3. Ken Alex, A Period of Consequences: Global Warming as Public Nuisance, 26A STAN. 
ENVTL. L.J. 77, 77 (2007). 
4. The Kyoto Protocol expires in 2012. Kyle W. Danish, The International Regime, in GLOBAL 
CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 31, 31 (Michael B. Gerrard, ed., Am. Bar Ass’n 2007). The 
international community’s first step toward developing a post-Kyoto treaty regime is embodied in 
the Copenhagen Accord, which was drafted in December 2009 at the Fifteenth Conference of the 
Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Though merely a non-
binding political agreement, the Accord reflects the shift in focus to adaptation by recognizing the 
disproportionate climate change impacts that developing countries now endure and establishing a 
fund to address adaptation to those impacts. See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change 
Conference of the Parties, Copenhagen, Den., Dec. 7–19, 2009, Copenhagen Accord, arts. 1, 2, 3, 6, 
7, 8, and 10, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/L.7 (Dec. 18, 2009), available at http://unfccc.int/ 
resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/11a01.pdf#page=4.pdf [hereinafter Copenhagen Accord]. 
5. David Hunter, The Implications of Climate Change Litigation for International Environmental 
Law-Making, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE, NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL 
APPROACHES 357, 358 (William C.G. Burns & Hari M. Osofsky eds., 2009). 
6. For a discussion of the basic principles of the climate justice movement, see generally Alice 
Kaswan, Justice in a Warming World, 26 ENVTL. FORUM 48, 48–70 (2009). 
7. See generally Rebecca Tsosie, Indigenous People and Environmental Justice: The Impact of 
Climate Change, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 1625 (2007) (arguing for recognition of an indigenous right 
to environmental self-determination, which would allow indigenous peoples to maintain their 
cultural and political status in their traditional lands and would impose affirmative requirements on 
nation-states to engage in a mitigation strategy to avoid catastrophic harm to indigenous peoples). 
8. See generally Sara C. Aminzadeh, A Moral Imperative: The Human Rights Implications of 
Climate Change, 30 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 231 (2007); Sumudu Ataputtu, Global 
Climate Change: Can Human Rights (and Human Beings) Survive This Onslaught?, 20 COLO. J. 
INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 35 (2008); Jessie Hohmann, Igloo as Icon: A Human Rights Approach to 
Climate Change for the Inuit?, 18 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 295 (2009); Int’l Council 
on Human Rights, Climate Change and Human Rights: A Rough Guide (2008), 
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implement a human rights-based response to this problem is that such an 
approach is notoriously difficult to enforce, both domestically and 
internationally. 
The climate justice movement stands to gain a great deal if it could 
use common-law enforcement mechanisms as a bootstrap to lay a 
foundation for a codified framework of climate justice rights and 
remedies in domestic and international law instruments. Legislative 
responses at the national and regional levels that implement cooperative 
international solutions to the climate change problem are best, but such 
solutions take time and leave gaps. For example, the negotiations for the 
post-Kyoto regime will likely address climate justice concerns at some 
level, but will inevitably leave gaps regarding how victims of climate 
change impacts may seek recourse to protect their rights to self-
determination.9 
At least in the near future, common law mechanisms will continue to 
be the most viable options to ensure adequate forms of relief for the 
victims of climate change impacts in the United States and elsewhere. 
Public nuisance claims have been one of the most prominent forms of 
common-law-based climate change litigation. These suits have evolved 
in three stages, which are reflected in several cases. The first stage in 
this sequence involved a suit by state attorneys general on behalf of 
citizens against major power companies for injunctive relief to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions.10 The second stage involved the same class of 
plaintiffs—state attorneys general led by California—against major 
automobile manufacturers for damages for climate change impacts in 
California.11 Currently, the third stage, and most important for purposes 
of this Article, involves suits by individual plaintiffs for climate change 
impacts that they experienced directly in the wake of Hurricane 
Katrina,12 and in the form of coastal erosion impacts in the Native 
Village of Kivalina, Alaska.13 
                                                     
http://www.ichrp.org/en/projects/136. 
9. For example, after years of negotiations focusing on climate change adaptation concerns in 
developing countries, the Copenhagen Accord drafted in December 2009 only scratched the surface 
of the climate change adaptation challenges that developing countries now face. See Copenhagen 
Accord, supra note 4. For a discussion of the relevant provisions of the Copenhagen Accord and 
how they leave much to be desired in providing viable climate justice relief, see infra Part IV.B. 
10. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated, 582 F.3d 
309 (2d Cir. 2009). For a discussion of Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co., see infra Part 
II.B.1. 
11. California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 
2007). For a discussion of California v. General Motors Corporation, see infra Part II.B.2. 
12. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009). For a discussion of Comer v. 
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Public nuisance suits for climate change impacts have been 
controversial to say the least. Public nuisance suits seeking damages 
from lead paint manufacturers, when applied in the climate change 
litigation context, have been referred to as “alchemy in the courtroom”14 
and, in a related vein, as “[p]erhaps the most innovative but problematic 
litigation strategy being pursued.”15 Nevertheless, public nuisance suits 
in the climate litigation context can help the cause of climate justice by 
helping to secure human rights-based relief for those disproportionately 
affected by climate change impacts.16 
Part I of this Article examines the nature and scope of climate change 
impacts to vulnerable populations throughout the world and how the 
climate justice movement emerged to respond to the plight of these 
victimized populations. Part II traces the evolution of public nuisance 
claims for climate change issues, beginning with the federal common 
law of interstate pollution as the foundation for such claims. Part III 
discusses the Kivalina case17 as a turning point in public nuisance claims 
for climate change impacts. It first addresses how the plaintiffs’ 
litigation strategy in Kivalina builds on and learns from the public 
nuisance cases that preceded it, and then considers what obstacles 
remain for Kivalina-like litigation to be viable in the future. 
Part IV concludes that the Kivalina case involves the right set of facts 
and legal theories to afford a remedy to this class of victims of climate 
change impacts without opening the door too far for future litigants. 
Theories of relief originally enshrined in successful, albeit piecemeal, 
common law actions represent a small and necessary first step to sound a 
warning bell and provide some relief to vulnerable populations affected 
by climate change impacts. More importantly, the Kivalina case also 
could help lay a foundation for possible long-term, institutionalized 
frameworks at the international level to address on a broader scale the 
rights of populations disproportionately affected by climate change. 
Such an opportunity could mirror and capitalize on the evolution of 
                                                     
Murphy Oil USA, see infra Part II.B.3. 
13. Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
14. Richard O. Faulk & John S. Gray, Alchemy in the Courtroom? The Transmutation of Public 
Nuisance Litigation, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 941, 941 (2007). 
15. Kevin Haroff & Jacqueline Hartis, Climate Change and the Courts: Litigating the Causes and 
Consequences of Global Warming, 22 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 50, 55 (2007–2008). 
16. Hunter, supra note 5, at 357, 360. But see Shi-Ling Hsu, A Realistic Evaluation of Climate 
Change Litigation Through the Lens of a Hypothetical Lawsuit, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 701, 701 
(2008) (discussing the Inuit as strong plaintiffs and electric companies as vulnerable defendants, and 
how even with those ideal parties the prospect of successful climate litigation is bleak). 
17. Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d 863. 
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citizen suits under federal environmental laws by institutionalizing a 
private right to be free from climate change impacts that threaten the 
sustainability of vulnerable communities in a post-Kyoto world. 
I.  CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS AND THE NEED FOR THE 
CLIMATE JUSTICE MOVEMENT 
This section of the Article first considers the nature and scope of 
climate change impacts on vulnerable populations throughout the world. 
It then examines the evolution of climate justice and traces its origins to 
the environmental justice movement in the United States and to the ever-
increasing interplay between human rights and the environment in 
international law. 
A. The Nature and Scope of Climate Change Impacts on Vulnerable 
Populations 
Devastating climate change impacts have been projected for some 
time now. In 2000, scientists predicted temperature increases of up to 
10.8 degrees Fahrenheit and sea levels rising thirty-one inches in the 
next century.18 These escalations were attributed to heat-trapping 
emissions from industrial pollution and car exhaust.19 Effects of this 
trend include, for example, atolls becoming inundated, coral reef 
erosion, rising seas threatening fresh water supplies, destruction of 
infrastructure, and intensified storm systems.20 
These predictions have become a reality. In fact, for some vulnerable 
areas and populations, it is already too late for a meaningful legal 
response to climate change impacts. For example, Lohachara Island, in 
India’s part of the Sundarbans, was the first inhabited island to be 
claimed by rising seas; this left 10,000 inhabitants homeless.21 In 
addition, some of the uninhabited islands of Kiribati, a Pacific atoll 
nation, and Suparibhanga, Lohachara’s neighbor, have been lost.22 One-
half of the populated island of Ghoramara also has been permanently 
inundated, and more of the island is expected to be inundated in the near 
                                                     
18. Jerome Socolovsky, Island Nations Desperate for Action on Global Warming, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, Nov. 17, 2000, http://www.commondreams.org/headlines/111700-01.htm. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Geoffrey Lean, Disappearing World: Global Warming Claims Tropical Island, THE 
INDEPENDENT, Dec. 24, 2006, http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/climate-change/ 
disappearing-world-global-warming-claims-tropical-island-429764.html. 
22. Id. 
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future.23 In total, a dozen islands, inhabited by 70,000 residents, are 
considered to be in danger of being swallowed by the sea.24 Other areas 
in the Indian Ocean are similarly threatened by climate change impacts. 
Waves threaten the coastline of Zanzibar,25 and Bangladesh bears the 
risk of overflowing rivers and rising seas.26 In the Maldives alone, sixty 
percent of the 194 inhabited islands of the archipelago are currently 
facing varying degrees of erosion.27 
These climate change impacts also threaten other low-lying areas of 
the world. In the North Sea, Sylt, the largest German Frisian island, has 
lost 800,000 cubic meters of sand from its beaches.28 In the Pacific 
Ocean, Micronesia has lost islets; Fiji is experiencing reduced rainfall, 
coastal erosion, and coral bleaching; an eight-foot sea wall cannot 
prevent an airport from flooding in the Marshall Islands; and populations 
are being displaced in Vanuatu and Tuvalu.29 
Should global warming continue at its present rate, an estimated 2,000 
Torres Strait Islanders would be displaced to the Australian mainland 
later this century.30 Global sea levels are projected to rise twenty-six to 
fifty-nine centimeters by 2100.31 The islands are highly susceptible to 
these proposed conditions due to their low elevation, some parts only 
being one meter above sea level.32 The Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) Fourth Assessment Report determined that the 
Torres Straits will be among the “most vulnerable regions” to climate 
change in Australia.33 
The indigenous peoples of Australia also must confront the harsh 
realities of global warming. Current climate projections for the next fifty 
                                                     
23. Somini Sungupta, Sea’s Rise in India Buries Islands and a Way of Life, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 
2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/1 1/world/asia/11india.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1. 
24. Lean, supra note 21. 
25. Fredrica Boswell, Waves Threaten Zanzibar Paradise, BBC NEWS, Dec. 13, 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7100107.stm. 
26.  Catherine Jacob, Vanishing Islands of Bangladesh: Climate Change Toll, SKY NEWS, Feb. 
27, 2008, http://news.sky.com/skynews/Home/Sky-News-Archive/Article/20080641296130. 
27. Simon Gardner, Interview-Sea May Swallow Maldives if Global Warming Unchecked, 
REUTERS, Feb. 3, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSCOL104974. 
28. Julio Godoy, Climate Change: Islands Could Fall off the Map, IPS NEWS, Feb. 17, 2007, 
http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=36618. 
29. Global Islands Network, Disappearing Islands, http://www.globalislands.net/news/ 
newsdeskitem.php?newstype=Special&newsid=4660&mfxsr=8 (last visited Aug. 10, 2009). 
30. Id. at Part I. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at Part II C. 
33. Id. 
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years in northern Australia include higher temperatures, more extreme 
rainfall, sea level rise, and more intense cyclones.34 Potential 
consequences include the erosion and saltwater inundation of long 
sections of coastline, river deltas, wetland areas, and offshore islands, 
while inland areas are likely to have more bushfires, dust storms, 
flooding, droughts, and extremes in temperatures.35 These changes to the 
surrounding environment will have detrimental effects on these natural-
resource-dependent peoples.36 Rising temperatures and precipitation can 
result in increased heat stress, respiratory diseases, communicable 
diseases, and mosquito-borne diseases, such as Dengue.37 Sea level rise 
and coastal erosion can destroy homes and infrastructure,38 while the 
destruction of agriculture and ceremonial sites can harm a people’s 
livelihood and culture.39 These potential harms could be realized unless 
immediate action is taken to prevent them. 
These impacts have caused a new era of environmental refugeeism.40 
As of this writing, there are approximately twenty-five million 
environmental refugees around the world.41 Poor crop yields in Mexico 
are exacerbating the existing problem of Mexican citizens illegally 
crossing the border into the United States.42 Drought in northeast Brazil 
is forcing one in every five people born there to leave their homeland to 
avoid drought.43 The Gobi Desert is slowly devouring 4000 square miles 
                                                     
34. DONNA GREEN, CLIMATE CHANGE AND HEALTH: IMPACTS ON REMOTE INDIGENOUS 
COMMUNITIES IN NORTHERN AUSTRALIA, 1 CSIRO Marine and Atmospheric Research Paper 012, 
§ 1.4 (2006), available at http://www.sharingknowledge.net.au/files/climateimpacts_health_ 
report.pdf. 
35. Id. 
36. David S.G. Thomas & Chasca Twyman, Equity and Justice in Climate Change Adaptation 
Amongst Natural-Resource-Dependent Societies, 15 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 115, 115 (2005), 
available at http://www.astepback.com/GCC/Equity%20and%20Justice%20in%20CC%20 
Adaptation.pdf. These populations are subsistence-based communities, often comprised of 
indigenous peoples, and are on the front-line of climate change impacts because of a lack of 
infrastructure and because they often reside close to the sea for fishing. Id. 
37. GREEN, supra note 34, § 1.4. 
38. Id. §§ 1.4, 1.5. 
39. Id. § 1.4. 
40. See generally Bonnie Docherty & Tyler Giannini, Confronting a Rising Tide: A Proposal for 
a Convention on Climate Change Refugees, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 349 (2009). 
41. Jordan Tchilingirian, Global Warming Is Creating Climate Change Refugees Says Christian 
Agency, EKKLESIA, Oct. 20, 2006, http://www.ekklesia.co.uk/content/news_syndication/ 
article_061019refugees.shtml. 
42. Id. 
43. Id.; see also Seren Boyd & Rachel Roach, Feeling the Heat: A Report from Tearfund 5, 15 
(2006), http://www.tearfund.org/webdocs/Website/News/Feeling%20the%20Heat%20Tearfund% 
20report.pdf. 
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per year of the inhabitable lands that lie next to it in China.44 In Nigeria 
alone, 1350 square miles of land are converted to desert each year, 
forcing farmers and others dependent on agriculture to flee to urban 
areas.45 
More specific examples of climate change migration have taken place 
in the Republic of Kiribati and Tuvalu, two low-lying atoll nations in the 
Pacific region.46 Although it has been difficult to pinpoint the causes for 
population movements from rural-outer-islands to urban-central islands, 
there is strong evidence that environmental factors play an important 
role.47 Sea level rise, influxes of drought, loss of land, unreliable food 
and water supplies, and general health decline have all contributed to 
these movements.48 In Kiribati, more than half of the population resides 
in the Gilbert Island group, where the capital of South Tarawa is 
located.49 The Southern Gilbert Islands have been overwhelmed by long 
periods of drought and shorter periods of rainfall.50 The Southern 
Gilberts can have as little as 360 millimeters of rain per year in 
comparison to the 2,400 millimeters typical for the Northern Gilberts.51 
Population movements have also been correlated to increased potable 
water scarcity, influxes of drought, coral reef depletion, and coastal 
erosion on outer islands.52 In Tuvalu, owners of coastal lands that had 
become increasingly salinated by the encroaching sea had to relocate to 
the makeshift settlement of Fongafale on Funafuti.53 If current global 
climate trends are allowed to continue, an increasing number of island 
communities will be forced to leave their homes. 
The United States also has been unable to avoid the grim reality of 
climate change induced migration. In fact, the largest example of this 
phenomenon has occurred on American soil. Millions of Gulf Coast 
residents were forced to abandon their homes and seek shelter elsewhere 
when Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans in August 2005.54 Large 
                                                     
44. Tchilingirian, supra note 41. 
45. Id. 
46. Justin Locke, Climate Change-Induced Migration in the Pacific Region: Sudden Crisis and 
Long Term Developments, 175 GEOGRAPHICAL J. 171 (2009). 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 1. 
49. Id. at 1, 9. 
50. Id. at 12–13. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 176, 177. 
54. Lester R. Brown, Global Warming Forcing U.S. Coastal Population to Move Inland: 
Estimated 250,000 Katrina Evacuees Are Now Climate Refugees (Aug. 16, 2006), 
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parts of the city still face major challenges due to blight, unaffordable 
housing, and infrastructure issues. According to the Brookings 
Institution Metropolitan Policy Program and the Greater New Orleans 
Community Data Center, “[a]s of June 2009, nine neighborhoods still 
have less than half of the active residential addresses they did before 
Katrina.”55 The scale of abandonment remains high in New Orleans, St. 
Bernard, and Jefferson parishes with 65,888; 14,372; and 11,516 
unoccupied residences, respectively.56 Housing affordability continues to 
be a pressing challenge for many critical workers and lower income 
residents trying to return to local neighborhoods where rents are at an 
all-time high.57 Furthermore, public transportation and other community 
services such as childcare are operating at a fraction of pre-storm 
operation levels.58 
Climate change induced devastation also has plagued indigenous 
peoples in Alaska. Increased temperatures in the Arctic have diminished 
the thickness, extent, and duration of sea ice that forms along the coast 
of Kivalina,59 located at the tip of a six-mile long barrier reef, 
approximately seventy miles north of the Arctic Circle on the northwest 
coast of Alaska.60 Without the protection formerly provided by sea ice 
and land-fast sea ice, Kivalina has become vulnerable to destruction 
from waves, storm surges, and erosion.61 The U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, Alaska District, confirmed these changes in an April 2006 
report stating that due to global climate change, the Chukchi Sea was 
less likely to be frozen during winter storms.62 Additionally, in 
December 2003, the United States Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) reported that “the right combination of storm events could flood 
the entire village at any time.”63 
                                                     
http://www.earthpolicy.org/index.php?/plan_b_updates/2006/update57#. 
55. THE BROOKINGS INST. METRO. POLICY PROGRAM & GREATER NEW ORLEANS CMTY. DATA 
CTR., THE NEW ORLEANS INDEX: TRACKING RECOVERY OF NEW ORLEANS 18 (Aug. 2009), 
https://gnocdc.s3.amazonaws.com/NOLAIndex/NOLAIndex.pdf. 
56. Id. at 6. 
57. GCR & Assocs., Inc., The New Orleans Region 4 Years After Katrina: A Focus on Recovery 
3 (2009), http://www.gcrconsulting.com/downloads/Katrina%20Four%20Year%20Ann.pdf. 
58. Id. 
59. Complaint for Damages at 45, Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 
2009) (No. CV08-1138 SBA). 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 45–46. 
63. Id. 
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Due to the amount of erosion that Kivalina has already endured, and 
its increased vulnerability to continued damage, the GAO has 
determined that remaining on the island is no longer a viable option for 
the community.64 
The Native Village of Kivalina is a self-governing, federally 
recognized Inupiat Eskimo village65 of approximately 400 people who 
reside in the city of Kivalina, Alaska.66 The ongoing destruction of 
Kivalina property has necessitated the relocation of the entire village.67 
The Army Corps of Engineers projects the cost of relocation to be 
between $95 and $125 million,68 whereas the GAO estimates that it will 
cost between $100 and $400 million.69 The Village of Kivalina will face 
devastation should the community not be relocated.70 
On September 13, 2008, Senator Lisa Murkowski (R-Alaska) 
remarked that her state is at the “tip of the spear” of climate change in 
the United States.71 This metaphor effectively captures the plight of 
vulnerable populations on the front line of climate change impacts. The 
Kivalina litigation seeks to secure a remedy for one such vulnerable 
population and, in turn, can help inspire and lay a foundation for a new 
era of legal remedies for similarly situated victims domestically and 
internationally.72 
B. Climate Justice as a Response to the Plight of Vulnerable 
Populations 
Climate justice has both domestic and international law 
underpinnings. First, the evolution of environmental justice in the United 
States helped lay a foundation for the climate justice field by 
recognizing an area outside of the traditional boundaries of 
environmental law for which the law should provide a remedy—namely, 
the disproportionate impacts of environmental regulation on minority 
and low-income communities.73 This theory encountered some obstacles 
                                                     
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 4. 
66. Id. at 1. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 46. 
70. Id. at 45–46. 
71. Margaret Kriz, Swept Away, NAT’L J., Sept. 13, 2008, at 44. 
72. For a discussion of the Kivalina litigation and its implications for enhancing climate justice 
relief domestically and internationally, see infra Parts III, IV. 
73. The international law framework can also influence domestic approaches to environmental 
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when tested in the federal courts under Equal Protection Clause analysis 
and it ultimately failed to secure remedies for such disproportionate 
impacts through the court system.74 The litigation was not in vain, 
however, as it raised awareness of the need for a response to this 
inequity and prompted subsequent proactive measures at the federal and 
state levels to mitigate or avoid such disproportionate impacts in the 
future.75 
Beyond the realm of environmental justice in the United States, a 
parallel development under international law evolved concerning the 
growing recognition of the intersection between environmental law and 
human rights.76 The rise of the notion of sustainable development has 
helped fuel this awareness, and scenarios involving unsustainable 
growth that caused disproportionate impacts on indigenous populations 
(such as deforestation and development in the Amazon) have drawn 
international attention. More recently, climate change has created the 
potential for cultural genocide77 or may at least require the relocation of 
these peoples.78 
At the international level, the movement to recognize a human right to 
a healthy environment has enjoyed decades of support, and has increased 
significantly with the increase in awareness regarding climate change 
impacts. More specifically, the importance of the right to a healthy 
                                                     
justice. See generally, e.g., Maxine Burkette, Just Solutions to Climate Change: A Climate Justice 
Proposal for a Domestic Clean Development Mechanism, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 169 (2008) (arguing for 
application of a component of the international environmental law framework, the Clean 
Development Mechanism from the Kyoto Protocol, to domestic environmental justice 
circumstances). 
74. See generally Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (holding that Title VI does not 
create a private right of action to enforce disparate impact regulations); S. Camden Citizens in 
Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that the EPA’s disparate 
impact regulations do not create a right enforceable under section 1983). 
75. See, e.g., Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and 
Low-Income Populations, Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1995), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 
4321 (2006) requiring federal agencies to administer their programs, policies, and activities that 
affect human health or the environment in a manner that avoids, to the maximum extent possible, 
“disproportionately high and adverse” effects on minority and low-income populations). 
76. Angela Williams, Promoting Justice within the International Legal System: Prospects for 
Climate Refugees, in CLIMATE LAW AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: LEGAL AND POLICY 
CHALLENGES FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY 84, 84 (Benjamin J. Richardson, et al., eds., 2009). 
77.  “Cultural genocide” in this context refers to the loss of cultural values and traditions due to 
environmental devastation. See AFP, Climate Change ‘Cultural Genocide’ for Aborigines, May 4, 
2009, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jZHYtI_h8rs0_K_iTK470lQ57hMA 
(“Rising sea levels and soaring temperatures would make their homelands uninhabitable, severing 
spiritual links and laying waste to the environment.”). 
78. See supra Part I. 
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environment in developing nations has attracted attention,79 especially in 
developing nations that are either particularly vulnerable 
environmentally to climate change, or that lack the infrastructure to 
respond adequately to such threats.80 
The latest climate change science confirms the importance of an 
institutionalized climate justice framework as part of the post-Kyoto 
regime. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) released 
a report in September 2009 entitled Climate Change Science 
Compendium 2009.81 This UNEP report underscores the need for 
immediate action to avoid the catastrophic climate change impacts that 
are projected by 2100, as well as the dangerous “tipping points” that 
could be reached within a few decades that would have tragic 
implications for the world’s major ecosystems, such as the Sahara and 
the Amazon.82 The report notes that it still may be possible to avoid 
many of these catastrophic impacts, but only if there is “effective, 
efficient, and equitable” action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and 
states take proactive measures to assist vulnerable countries adapt to the 
projected impacts.83 
Responding to the needs of vulnerable communities is not a “one size 
fits all” proposition. For example, the impacts of climate change on 
indigenous peoples raise difficult legal and ethical issues. Professor 
Rebecca Tsosie has suggested that the standard adaptation strategy of 
relocating a vulnerable population out of harm’s way could be culturally 
genocidal for many groups of indigenous people when viewed in the 
climate justice context.84 As an alternative, she argues for recognition of 
an indigenous right to environmental self-determination, which would 
allow indigenous peoples to maintain their cultural and political status 
upon their traditional lands.85 In the context of climate change policy, 
                                                     
79. See, e.g., TIM HAYWARD, CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS 200–15 (2005) 
(discussing the value of establishing constitutional environmental rights for poorer societies); Amy 
Sinden, An Emerging Human Right to Security from Climate Change: The Case Against Gas 
Flaring in Nigeria, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 5, at 173 (examining theories 
under which a right to security from climate change could be grounded in human rights theory and 
how such rights might be applied to impose liability on a private multinational corporation). 
80. U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE (UNFCCC), CLIMATE 
CHANGE: IMPACTS, VULNERABILITIES AND ADAPTATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 5–6 (2007), 
available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/impacts.pdf. 
81. U.N. Environment Programme, Climate Change Science Compendium 2009, 
http://www.unep.org/compendium2009/ (offering the full text of the report). 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 51. 
84. See generally Tsosie, supra note 7. 
85. Id. at 1657–74. 
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such a right would impose affirmative requirements on nation-states to 
develop a plan to avoid catastrophic harm to indigenous peoples.86 
Tsosie further recognizes that tort-based theories of compensation for 
the harms of climate change have only limited capacity to address the 
concerns of indigenous peoples.87 Ultimately, public nuisance claims in 
Kivalina-like scenarios are an important step, but only the beginning. 
II.  PUBLIC NUISANCE CLAIMS FOR CLIMATE CHANGE 
IMPACTS AS A FOUNDATION FOR CLIMATE JUSTICE 
RELIEF 
To understand how public nuisance suits can enhance the opportunity 
for climate justice remedies domestically and internationally, it is 
necessary to examine the origin and evolution of these claims leading up 
to the Kivalina case. This Part discusses the narrow, but secure federal 
common-law foundation of interstate pollution jurisprudence, which 
underlies public nuisance claims for climate change impacts. It then 
traces the three-part evolution of public nuisance suits for climate 
change impacts. 
A.  Historical and Conceptual Foundations of Interstate Pollution 
Claims 
An important threshold question is whether public nuisance claims for 
climate change impacts are justiciable. Climate change impacts are a 
form of interstate pollution. Although almost exclusively regulated by 
federal statutes, interstate pollution is also subject to federal common- 
law claims that trace their origins to two foundational cases: Georgia v. 
Tennessee Copper Co.88 and Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee 
I).89 
In 1907, in the landmark case of Tennessee Copper, the state of 
Georgia sought an injunction against Tennessee Copper for the 
company’s sulfur dioxide emissions, which were transported by wind 
                                                     
86. Id. at 1674. 
87. Id. at 1675. 
88. 206 U.S. 230 (1907). 
89. 406 U.S. 91 (1972). For a helpful discussion of the role of Milwaukee I and City of Milwaukee 
v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304 (1981), in interstate pollution cases, see generally Matthew 
F. Pawa, This Town Ain’t Big Enough for the Two of Us: Interstate Pollution and Federalism under 
Milwaukee I and Milwaukee II, 2009 A.B.A. SEC. ENV’T., ENERGY, AND RES. 121, available at 
http://www.abanet.org/environ/programs/keystone/2009/bestpapers/ 
MatthewPawa_Keystone2009.pdf. See infra note 157 for a discussion of the Milwaukee II case. 
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and detrimentally affected five counties in Georgia.90 These injuries 
included the destruction of forests, orchards, and crops.91 Although 
Georgia was not the private property owner of these affected regions, the 
Court determined that the state “has an interest independent of and 
behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its 
domain.”92 The Court further stated that Georgia had the final word as to 
the protection and maintenance of its natural resources.93 The creation of 
the United States had not precluded states from protecting these quasi-
sovereign interests.94 Rather, the Court reasoned, a state in such a 
situation “is somewhat more certainly entitled to specific relief than a 
private party might be.”95 
The Court noted that the traditional means of equitably balancing the 
harm between private parties cannot be applied when at least one party is 
a state.96 A state should not be required to relinquish its quasi-sovereign 
rights for compensation.97 It is “fair” and “reasonable” that a state 
demand that its resources be left unharmed.98 In Tennessee Copper, 
neither the injuries caused by, nor the conduct of, the defendants was 
contested.99 The Court issued an injunction against the company.100 
Therefore, Tennessee Copper established the principle that a state 
subjected to interstate air pollution is able to seek injunctive relief from 
an emissions source in a neighboring state that caused the pollution 
problem. This premise sets one of the pillars in place for public nuisance 
cases for climate change impacts because such impacts are the product 
of the interstate, indeed global, phenomenon of climate change. 
In 1972, in Milwaukee I, the Supreme Court issued its decision in the 
second foundational case concerning interstate pollution, which involved 
a water pollution dispute.101 Illinois alleged that four cities in Wisconsin 
were polluting Lake Michigan, an interstate body of water. While 
                                                     
90. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 236. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. at 237. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 238. 
97. Id. at 237. 
98. Id. at 238. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 239. 
101. 406 U.S. 91, 93 (1972). 
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Illinois had prohibited the pollution at issue on its side of the lake, 
Wisconsin had not.102 
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA, also known as the 
Clean Water Act),103 rather than state law, controls interstate water 
pollution claims.104 Milwaukee I required application of federal common 
law, with some deference to state law, because the federal law only sets 
a floor.105 States are given time to create their own water standards 
above this floor, but if they are unable to do so, the federal government 
may step in and ask the state to abate the pollution.106 Federal common 
law is applied “where there is an overriding federal interest in the need 
for a uniform rule of decision or where the controversy touches basic 
interests of federalism.”107 
Interstate water pollution claims, like the one at issue in Milwaukee I, 
are public nuisance claims. When one state causes a public nuisance in 
another state, injunctive relief is available.108 In Milwaukee I, the Court 
concluded that federal district courts have jurisdiction over interstate 
water pollution disputes that allegedly create a public nuisance, and that 
the Supreme Court has the discretion to remit such disputes to 
appropriate federal district courts for resolution.109 The Court reasoned 
that although the remedies Illinois sought for apportioning interstate 
waters were not authorized under the FWPCA, the application of federal 
common law was consistent with the FWPCA.110 It noted that while 
federal environmental protection statutes are sources of federal law, they 
do not necessarily represent the exclusive scope of federal law.111 Until 
new federal laws preempt the federal common law of nuisance, federal 
courts will balance the equities in public nuisance suits regarding 
interstate water pollution.112 
Relief for interstate pollution is also available to state plaintiffs under 
state public nuisance laws. For example, in North Carolina v. Tennessee 
                                                     
102. Id. 
103. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006). 
104. Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 102. 
105. Id. at 107. 
106. Id. at 102. 
107. Id. at 105 n.6 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421–27 (1964)). 
108. Id. at 106 n.8 (quoting North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 374 (1923)). 
109. Id. at 108. 
110. Id. at 103–04. 
111. Id. at 103 n.5, 107 n.9. 
112. Id. at 107. 
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Valley Authority (North Carolina II),113 North Carolina sued the 
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) on behalf of its citizens alleging that 
the TVA’s use of coal-fired power plants constituted a public 
nuisance.114 North Carolina alleged it was harmed by nitrogen, sulfur 
dioxide, mercury, and other secondary pollutants from the TVA’s 
emissions in neighboring states.115 It claimed that these emissions 
constituted a public nuisance in the form of air pollution which, after 
being emitted in other states, travels into North Carolina and threatens 
the citizens’ health, the state’s economy, and the aesthetics of the 
region.116 
North Carolina sought injunctive relief because the cost of abating the 
nuisance would be very high.117 It filed suit in federal court under the 
Clean Air Act (CAA)118 “savings clause,” which allows the court to 
proceed under state public nuisance laws.119 The court concluded that it 
had jurisdiction over the complaint and the injunctive relief sought, but 
noted that this type of disagreement must be settled based on the state 
law of each plant’s locale, not a system-wide cap which could infringe 
on the powers of the legislative or executive branches.120 
The TVA is a federal entity and the largest public electricity system in 
the United States, servicing large portions of Tennessee, Kentucky, 
Mississippi, and Alabama, and portions of Georgia, North Carolina, and 
Virginia.121 It owns and operates eleven plants, seven of which are in 
Tennessee, two of which are in Kentucky, and two of which are in 
Alabama.122 The TVA made three primary arguments to disclaim 
responsibility for the alleged public nuisance. First, although the 
emissions entered North Carolina, the harm alleged was mostly due to 
North Carolina’s own emissions; second, the TVA’s conduct was 
reasonable because its service is a necessity for millions who rely on less 
expensive energy; and third, the TVA has made efforts to reduce 
                                                     
113. 593 F. Supp. 2d 812 (W.D.N.C. 2009). 
114. Id. at 815. 
115. Id. at 818–28. 
116. Id. at 815. 
117. Id. 
118. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006). 
119. See North Carolina II, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 816 (citing North Carolina v. Tenn. Valley Auth. 
(North Carolina I), 549 F. Supp. 2d 725, 729 (2008)). 
120. Id. at 816–17. But see Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(allowing a public nuisance claim for injunctive relief to proceed against the six largest power 
companies in the nation). 
121. North Carolina II, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 818. 
122. Id. 
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emissions already, so the emissions entering North Carolina could not be 
considered to be in “unreasonable amounts.”123 
Given the TVA’s plant locations, the court applied the laws of 
Alabama, Kentucky, and Tennessee.124 The court granted North 
Carolina’s relief in part and denied it in part.125 Because the several 
plants North Carolina included in its complaint were in a few different 
states, the court analyzed each of the plants’ conduct separately based on 
the public nuisance law of the state where the plants were located.126 
These interstate pollution cases each involved states suing in a parens 
patriae capacity. The Milwaukee I and Tennessee Copper cases firmly 
established the federal common-law foundation upon which the public 
nuisance cases for climate change rely. The North Carolina case 
confirmed and extended this approach to interstate pollution dispute 
resolution through the application of state public nuisance law under the 
CAA’s savings clause. This firm foundation for resolving interstate 
pollution disputes paved the way for public nuisance suits for climate 
change impacts. 
B. The Three-Stage Evolution of Public Nuisance and Climate 
Change 
Drawing on the interstate pollution cases, the progression of public 
nuisance claims for climate change impacts began with Connecticut v. 
American Electric Power Co.,127 which involved states seeking 
injunctive relief. It was subsequently refined in California v. General 
Motors Corp.,128 in which the states adjusted their theory of the case and 
sought damages rather than injunctive relief. This state-as-plaintiff 
                                                     
123. Id. at 815. 
124. Id. at 829–34. 
125. Id. at 831–34. 
126. Id. at 817, 829–31. The court held that some of the plants were public nuisances to North 
Carolina by their state’s public nuisance laws, while some were not. The injunctions granted varied 
according to what controls the plant already employed. For plants that did not have scrubbers, the 
court held that these pollution controls must be installed and maintained properly for emissions 
reduction. Id. at 832. For plants that had broken scrubbers, or did not have enough to cover all the 
emissions, the court held that these controls must be fixed or additional ones must be added. Id. The 
court also applied an annual cap on emissions and required that TVA provide semi-annual 
accounting to confirm its compliance. Id. at 832–34. 
127. 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009). On November 
5, 2009, the defendants filed for a petition for rehearing en banc before the Second Circuit. Petition 
for Rehearing En Banc, Conn. Am. Elec. Power Co., No. 05-5104-cv (2d Cir. filed Nov. 5, 2005), 
available at http://www.bdlaw.com/assets/attachments/Connecticut%20v%20AEP%20Petition.pdf. 
128. No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007). 
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foundation then evolved into a claim for damages in Comer v. Murphy 
Oil USA,129 in which individual plaintiffs sought to recover for climate 
change impacts to their communities.130 
1. First Stage: States Sought to Enjoin Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
from the Private Sector in Connecticut v. American Electric Power 
Co. 
In American Electric Power, the district court dismissed the public 
nuisance case brought by various states and nonprofit land trusts against 
several power companies.131 The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief to 
reduce the power companies’ greenhouse gas emissions contributing to 
global warming.132 The threshold question in the case was whether the 
relief that the plaintiffs sought presented a nonjusticiable political 
question outside the scope of the court’s jurisdiction.133 
The political question doctrine requires federal courts to avoid 
deciding matters that are better left to the political branches to resolve. 
However, the mere fact that the issues in a case arise in a politically 
charged context does not convert a case into a nonjusticiable political 
question.134 
In Baker v. Carr,135 the Court established six independent factors to 
determine whether a political question existed.136 The factors are: 
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the 
issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of 
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving 
it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy 
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] 
the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution 
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches 
                                                     
129. 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009). On November 30, 2009, the defendants filed for a petition for 
rehearing en banc before the Fifth Circuit. Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Comer v. Murphy Oil 
USA, No. 07-60756 (5th Cir. filed Nov. 30, 2009). See Jennifer Koons, Courts May Beat Congress, 
U.N. to Punch on GHGs, GREENWIRE, Dec. 17, 2009, http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/ 
2009/12/17/2. 
130. See infra Part III.B for a discussion of the impacts of these cases on the political question 
and standing doctrines. 
131. Am. Electric Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 267. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 271. 
134. See, e.g., Comer, 585 F.3d at 873. 
135. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
136. Id. at 217. 
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of government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning 
adherence to a political decision already made; or [6] the 
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious 
pronouncements by various departments on one question.137 
The factors from Baker v. Carr were not meant to serve as a stand-alone 
definition of a “political question.” Rather, they are intended to guide 
federal courts in deciding whether a question is entrusted by the 
Constitution or federal laws exclusively to a federal political branch for 
its decision.138 
The district court in American Electric Power concluded that the case 
presented a nonjusticiable political question because the court faced “the 
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a 
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.”139 The court reasoned that the 
scope and magnitude of the case touched on many areas of national and 
international policy, which reflected the “transcendently legislative 
nature” of the litigation.140 Furthermore, the court recognized the overall 
complexity of such policy determinations by noting several past and 
current actions (and deliberate inactions) of Congress and the executive 
branch on the issue of climate change.141 Ultimately, the case was 
dismissed because the injunctive relief sought required “identification 
and balancing of economic, environmental, foreign policy, and national 
security interests,” which the court determined to be a nonjusticiable 
political question for the political branches, not the judiciary, to 
address.142 
On September 22, 2009, in a long-awaited and pleasantly surprising 
decision for environmental plaintiffs, the Second Circuit vacated the 
district court’s dismissal of the public nuisance claim,143 holding that the 
district court had erred in dismissing the case on political question 
                                                     
137. Id. 
138. Comer, 585 F.3d at 872 (“[I]f a party moving to dismiss under the political question doctrine 
is unable to identify a constitutional provision or federal law that arguably commits a material issue 
in the case exclusively to a political branch, the issue is clearly justiciable and the motion should be 
denied without applying the Baker formulations.”). 
139. 406 F. Supp. 2d, 265, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277–
78 (2004)), vacated, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009). 
140. Id. at 272. 
141. Id. at 273. 
142. Id. at 274. 
143. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 393. See generally Richard Lazarus, A Huge Green Win in 
the 2nd Circuit, 26 ENVTL. FORUM, Nov.–Dec. 2009, at 14 (describing the outcome and reasoning 
of the Second Circuit’s decision in American Electric Power and the challenges that the plaintiffs 
face in the wake of the decision). 
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grounds.144 The court further concluded that the plaintiffs had stated 
valid claims under the federal common law of nuisance.145 
On the political question issue, the court applied the six-factor test 
established in Baker v. Carr. The court noted that Baker set a high bar 
for nonjusticiability and that the Supreme Court has “only rarely” found 
that a political question bars adjudication of an issue.146 Particularly 
relevant to the court’s analysis was its discussion of the first and second 
factors from the Baker test.147 The court described the first Baker factor 
as the “dominant consideration in any political question inquiry.”148 It 
rejected the defendants’ arguments that allowing the plaintiffs’ claims 
would result in a national emissions policy or undermine the separation 
of powers.149 The court stated: 
Nowhere in their complaints do Plaintiffs ask the court to 
fashion a comprehensive and far-reaching solution to global 
climate change, a task that arguably falls within the purview of 
the political branches. Instead, they seek to limit emissions from 
six domestic coal-fired electricity plants on the ground that such 
emissions constitute a public nuisance that they allege has 
caused, is causing, and will continue to cause them injury.150 
The court also rejected the defendants’ arguments that the 
complexities involved in pollution control and climate change cases 
made it impossible to apply meaningful legal standards to this case.151 
The court reasoned that the defendants’ arguments were “undermined by 
the fact that federal courts have successfully adjudicated complex 
common law nuisance cases for over a century.”152 The court compared 
the plaintiffs’ claims to several past complex interstate nuisance cases 
that were considered to be judicially manageable.153 The Second Circuit 
concluded that “[w]ell-settled principles of tort and public nuisance law 
                                                     
144. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 315. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. at 321. 
147. Id. at 324–30. The first two factors of the Baker test are: “[1] a textually demonstrable 
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of 
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it.” Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 
(1962). 
148. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 324 (quoting Lamont v. Woods, 948 F.2d 825, 831 (2d 
Cir. 1991)). 
149. Id. at 325. 
150. Id. (citation omitted). 
151. Id. at 326–30. 
152. Id. at 326. 
153. Id. at 326–30. 
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provide appropriate guidance to the district court in assessing Plaintiffs’ 
claims and the federal courts are competent to deal with these issues.”154 
When a federal court has jurisdiction, the fact that a case may present 
complex issues is not an automatic reason for the court to shy away from 
resolving the matter. 
The court also held that the plaintiffs stated a valid claim under the 
federal common law of nuisance.155 It rejected defendants’ contentions 
that the plaintiffs’ public nuisance claims under federal common law 
should be dismissed because of their breadth and factual complexity.156 
Additionally, the court held that the CAA had not displaced157 a federal 
common law of nuisance action because the EPA has not yet regulated 
greenhouse gas emissions in such a way that “speaks directly” to the 
issue that the plaintiffs raised.158 
2. Second Stage: States Sought Damages Rather than Injunctive 
Relief in California v. General Motors Corp. 
In California v. General Motors Corp., the district court dismissed the 
claims brought by the State of California against various major 
automakers for allegedly “creating, and contributing to, an alleged 
public nuisance—global warming.”159 The State sought compensation 
for current and future expenditures and damages it had incurred and 
would continue to incur as a result of global warming.160 
In its analysis, the court referenced a chronology of relevant 
environmental policy actions taken by Congress and the executive 
branch in addressing the complex issue of global warming.161 Against 
this backdrop, the court examined the issue of whether the State’s claims 
presented nonjusticiable political questions.162 
                                                     
154. Id. at 329. 
155. Id. at 392. 
156. Id. at 326. 
157. The court distinguished Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304 (1981), which held that the 
comprehensive nature of the Clean Water Act had left no room for a federal common law of 
nuisance action for water pollution (i.e., the Court concluded that the Act had “displaced” such 
actions). 
158. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 381 (citing Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 319–24). 
159. No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at *1, *16 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007) (granting 
defendants’ motion to dismiss). 
160. Id. at *2. 
161. Id. at *3–5 (citing Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated, 
582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009)). 
162. Id. at *5–7. 
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The court reviewed and applied several cases, including Baker v. 
Carr, American Electric Power, and Massachusetts v. Environmental 
Protection Agency,163 regarding the tests for justiciability of political 
questions.164 Relying on these precedents, the court determined that it 
could not “adjudicate Plaintiff’s federal common law global warming 
nuisance tort claim without making an initial policy determination of a 
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.”165 Furthermore, the court 
concluded that the plaintiffs’ claims would have a significant effect on 
interstate commerce and foreign policy, reiterating that such issues are 
constitutionally committed to the political branches of government.166 
California appealed the case to the Ninth Circuit.167 In seeking a six-
month extension of the appeal, California stated that it would withdraw 
its appeal if the federal government responded in the interim to regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles or if any of the 
defendants filed for bankruptcy.168 In 2009, both of these conditions 
were met. First, the EPA “acknowledged that carbon dioxide and other 
greenhouse gases are a public health danger and must be regulated.”169 
In addition, “the President directed the Department of Transportation to 
establish higher national fuel efficiency standards in line with the 
standards California has sought to implement for the last several 
years.”170 Second, defendants Chrysler and General Motors filed for 
bankruptcy.171 Consequently, California voluntarily dismissed its appeal 
on June 19, 2009.172 
3. Third Stage: Private Plaintiffs Sought Damages in Comer v. 
Murphy Oil USA 
In Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, the plaintiffs sued several energy 
companies seeking relief for Hurricane Katrina-related property damage, 
                                                     
163. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
164. General Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *5–10. 
165. Id. at *13. 
166. Id. at *13–14. 
167. Unopposed Motion to Dismiss Appeal at 1, California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 07-16908 
(9th Cir. filed June 19, 2009), available at http://www.globalclimatelaw.com/uploads/file/ 
California%20v%20GM%20dismissal.pdf. 
168. Id. at 2. 
169. Id. (citing Declaration of Deputy Attorney General Harrison M. Pollak in Support of Motion 
to Dismiss Appeal at ¶ 2, Gen. Motors Corp., No. 07-16908 [hereinafter Pollak Declaration]) . 
170. Id. at 2–3 (citing Pollak Declaration ¶ 3, General Motors Corp., No. 07-16908). 
171. Id. at 3 (citing Pollak Declaration at ¶ 4, General Motors Corp., No. 07-16908). 
172. Id. at 4. 
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which allegedly had been intensified by the defendants’ contributions to 
global warming.173 The district court dismissed the case on standing and 
political question grounds.174 
To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must satisfy three 
requirements: (1) it has suffered an injury in fact that is “concrete and 
particularized” and that is “actual or imminent, not conjectural or 
hypothetical;”175 (2) the injury must be “fairly trace[able]” to the 
challenged action of the defendant;176 and (3) it must be “likely,” as 
opposed to merely “speculative,” that the injury will be “redressed by a 
favorable decision.”177 The district court’s standing decision was based 
on the determination that the alleged injuries were not “fairly 
attributable” or “traceable” to the individual defendants.178  
The district court addressed the political question issue by referencing 
the many individual state statutes and programs that have been created to 
address the issue of global warming.179 The purpose of this analysis was 
to demonstrate that the issue involves not only a legitimate and 
important debate, but one that “simply has no place in the court, until 
such time as Congress enacts legislation which sets appropriate 
standards by which this Court can measure conduct, whether it be 
reasonable or unreasonable . . . .”180 The court concluded that such 
policy decisions are best left to the legislative and executive branches of 
government because they are in the best position to make such decisions 
and are constitutionally empowered to do so.181 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed and concluded that the plaintiffs 
had standing and that the public nuisance claim could proceed because it 
was not a political question.182 In its standing analysis, the court focused 
on causation. It stated that the Article III traceability requirement “need 
not be as close as the proximate causation needed to succeed on the 
merits of a tort claim. Rather, an indirect causal relationship will suffice, 
                                                     
173. Transcript of Hearing of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 18–20, 23, Comer v. Murphy Oil 
USA, No. 1:05CV436-LG-RHW, 2007 WL 6942285 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 30, 2007) [hereinafter 
Transcript]. 
174. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 860 (5th Cir. 2009). 
175. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 
495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)). 
176. Id. at 560–61 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41–42 (1976)). 
177. Id. (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 41–42). 
178. Transcript, supra note 170, at 36. 
179. Id. at 36–39. 
180. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 860 n.2 (5th Cir. 2009). 
181. Id. 
182. Id. at 860. 
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so long as there is ‘a fairly traceable connection between the alleged 
injury in fact and the alleged conduct of the defendant.’”183 In 
concluding that the plaintiffs had satisfied the traceability requirement, 
the court analogized the Comer scenario to Massachusetts v. EPA, in 
which the Supreme Court determined that the causation element had 
been met.184 Like in Massachusetts v. EPA, the Fifth Circuit held that it 
did not matter if the defendants were merely a few of many sources to 
cause harm to the plaintiffs.185 To satisfy the “fairly traceable” element 
of standing, the court concluded that the relevant test is whether “the 
pollutant causes or contributes to the kinds of injuries alleged by the 
plaintiffs.”186 
The defendants relied on causation cases under the Clean Water Act 
(CWA)187 and argued that the holdings of these cases should not be 
extended to the global warming context. In rejecting the defendants’ 
arguments, the court provided important additional support for its 
conclusion that the fairly traceable standard is not limited to CWA cases: 
Defendants try to distinguish the above precedents on the 
ground that they are unique Clean Water Act (“CWA”) cases. 
Contrary to defendants’ argument or suggestion, the Clean 
Water Act could not and did not lower the constitutional 
minimum standing requirements and make CWA cases 
inapposite here. The CWA’s “grant of standing reaches the outer 
limits of Article III . . . Thus, if a Clean Water Act plaintiff 
meets the constitutional requirements for standing, then he ipso 
facto satisfies the statutory threshold as well.”188 
In its political question doctrine analysis, the Fifth Circuit made an 
important observation as to why public nuisance claims for climate 
change impacts must be considered justiciable, at least for the immediate 
                                                     
183. Id. at 864 (quoting Toll Bros., Inc. v. Twp. of Readington, 555 F.3d 131, 142 (3d Cir. 
2009)). 
184. Id. at 865 (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520–24 (2007)). The court 
distinguished other cases upon which the defendants relied, stating that those cases depended on 
independent superseding actions by parties not before the court, or they involved speculation about 
what the effects of the defendants’ action would be, or what actions other parties would take in the 
future. Id. at 865 n.5 (citing Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 520). 
185. Id. at 865. 
186. Id. at 866 (quoting Sierra Club v. Cedar Point Oil Co., 73 F.3d 546, 557 (5th Cir. 1996)). 
187. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006). 
188. Comer, 585 F.3d at 867 n.6 (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling 
Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 161 (4th Cir. 2000)). The court further reasoned that Congress cannot lower 
constitutional minimum standing requirements; therefore, standing jurisprudence under the CWA is 
fully applicable to this case. Id. Moreover, the court noted that the standing jurisprudence from the 
CWA cases has been applied to other contexts. Id. 
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future. The court noted that until the federal government responds to the 
climate change issue with legislation or regulations, “the Mississippi 
common law tort rules questions posed by the present case are 
justiciable, not political, because there is no commitment of those issues 
exclusively to the political branches of the federal government by the 
Constitution itself or by federal statutes or regulations.”189 Moreover, the 
court noted that even if Congress does enact a comprehensive federal 
law concerning greenhouse gas emissions, it might very well preserve 
state common law remedies, as the CWA did.190 
Two additional factors were critical to the court’s political question 
doctrine analysis. First, the case involved a private suit against private 
parties, not a suit arguing about the government’s action or inaction, and 
as such was less likely to be considered a nonjusticiable political 
question.191 Second, the plaintiffs were merely seeking damages, not an 
injunction. The court reasoned that actions for damages are more 
judicially manageable and are “considerably less likely to present 
nonjusticiable political questions.”192 The court relied on Fifth Circuit 
precedent to support this proposition, which concluded that “[m]onetary 
damages . . . do not . . . constitute a form of relief that is not judicially 
manageable.”193 
In reaching its decision, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged the Second 
Circuit’s recent decision in American Electric Power. It noted that the 
Second Circuit’s reasoning was fully consistent with the Fifth Circuit’s 
approach in Comer, particularly with respect to the Second Circuit’s 
“careful analysis of whether the case requires the court to address any 
specific issue that is constitutionally committed to another branch of 
government.”194 The court further noted that the defendants’ reliance on 
the district courts’ decisions in California v. General Motors Corp. and 
American Electric Power was improper, and that those decisions are 
“legally flawed” and “clearly distinguishable” from the present case.195 
The Fifth Circuit relied on two justifications for distinguishing these 
cases that are particularly relevant to the analysis in this Article. First, 
the court noted that the General Motors court “failed to explain how the 
‘national and international policy issues’ implicated by global warming, 
                                                     
189. Id. at 870. 
190. Id. at 878. The CWA’s savings clause appears at 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (2006). 
191. Comer, 585 F.3d at 873. 
192. Id. at 874. 
193. Id. (citing Gordon v. Texas, 153 F.3d 190, 195 (5th Cir. 1998)). 
194. Id. at 876 n.15. 
195. Id. at 876. 
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or the impossibility of attributing pollution to specific external sources in 
the global warming context, would render the political question doctrine 
applicable.”196 Second, the court emphasized that “[a]lthough the 
worldwide effects of greenhouse gas emissions may . . . . make it 
difficult for the plaintiffs to show proximate causation, it does not follow 
that the issue has been committed exclusively to the political branches 
for decision.”197 
III. KIVALINA V. EXXONMOBIL CORP. AS A MODEL FOR 
CLIMATE JUSTICE RELIEF 
The Kivalina litigation198 reflects the refinement in litigation strategy 
that has evolved from the public nuisance cases for climate change 
impacts that preceded it. In Kivalina, the plaintiffs, the Native Village of 
Kivalina and the City of Kivalina, Alaska, filed a public nuisance suit 
against several oil, energy, and utility companies for allegedly 
contributing to the effects of global warming from their excessive 
emissions of greenhouse gases.199 The plaintiffs claimed that the 
defendants’ emissions exacerbated sea level rise, contributing to 
increased coastal erosion that destroyed part of their village and 
requiring relocation of Kivalina’s residents.200 The Northern District of 
California granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction because the federal common law claim for public 
nuisance is barred by the political question doctrine, and the plaintiffs 
lacked standing.201 
This Part discusses the promise and potential pitfalls of the Kivalina 
litigation. It first reviews the Northern District of California’s decision 
addressing standing and the political question doctrine. It then analyzes 
the two most significant challenges facing the plaintiffs in Kivalina and 
similarly situated future plaintiffs seeking to recover for climate change 
impacts in public nuisance cases: (1) the political question doctrine and 
(2) standing. 
                                                     
196. Id. at 877 n.18 (quoting California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 
2726871, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007)). 
197. Id. 
198. Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009). On 
November 5, 2009, the plaintiffs in Kivalina filed their notice of appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit. See Koons, supra note 129. 
199. Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 868. 
200. Id. at 869. 
201. Id. at 868. 
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A. The Kivalina Litigation 
The threshold question in Kivalina was whether the court had subject 
matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ federal claim for common law 
nuisance.202 Like the plaintiffs in Comer, the plaintiffs in Kivalina 
sought damages, not injunctive relief.203 Unlike the Fifth Circuit in 
Comer, however, the Kivalina court concluded that the federal common 
law nuisance claim would force it to resolve a matter on which it lacked 
guidance to issue a reasoned conclusion.204 
The Northern District of California rejected the Second Circuit’s 
conclusion in American Electric Power that the common law provides 
judicially manageable standards to address the plaintiffs’ claims.205 It 
noted that the Second Circuit had relied on cases involving 
environmental injuries that are distinguishable from the injury at issue in 
Kivalina.206 The Kivalina court reasoned that “[w]hile a water pollution 
claim typically involves a discrete, geographically definable waterway, 
Plaintiffs’ global warming claim is based on the emission of greenhouse 
gases from innumerable sources located throughout the world and 
affecting the entire planet and its atmosphere.”207 
The Northern District of California then addressed standing, focusing 
on the “fairly traceable” standard for the causation element.208 The 
plaintiffs attempted to establish standing by alleging that the defendants 
had “contributed” to their injuries.209 The court determined that the 
“contribution” standard for traceability, which the Fifth Circuit applied 
in Comer, is limited to CWA actions.210 Unlike the Fifth Circuit in 
Comer, the court relied heavily on the geographic nexus requirement 
when viewing the substantial likelihood that defendants’ caused the 
alleged injury. “[T]o be ‘fairly traceable,’ the plaintiff must lie in the 
‘discharge zone of a polluter’ and not ‘so far downstream that their 
injuries cannot be fairly traced to that defendant.’”211 
                                                     
202. Id. at 870. 
203. Id. at 869. 
204. Id. at 871. 
205. Id. at 875. 
206. Id. 
207. Id. at 875. 
208. Id. at 877 (citing Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 167 (1997)). 
209. Id. (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149 (4th 
Cir. 2000); P.I.R.G. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1990)). 
210. Id. at 881. 
211. Id. at 879 (quoting Gaston Copper, 204 F.3d at 162). 
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In addition to finding that plaintiffs had failed the “zone of discharge” 
standard for traceability, the court also concluded that they had failed to 
meet the “seed of injury” requirement for traceability. It stated that 
“[e]ven if the contribution theory were applicable outside the context of 
a statutory water pollution claim, it is simply inapposite where, as here, 
Plaintiffs have not alleged that the ‘seed’ of their injury can be traced to 
any of the Defendants.”212 The plaintiffs conceded that the harm they 
alleged is a product of centuries of greenhouse gas emissions from “a 
multitude of sources other than the Defendants.”213 The court concluded 
that this attenuated chain of events failed the seed of the injury 
requirement.214 
The plaintiffs further argued that they were entitled to relaxed 
“special solicitude”215 standing requirements derived from 
Massachusetts v. EPA.216 The court concluded that the plaintiffs were 
not entitled to such special standing because, unlike the state plaintiff in 
Massachusetts v. EPA, the plaintiffs here were seeking damages against 
a variety of private interests, not asserting procedural rights concerning 
an agency’s rulemaking authority.217 
Consequently, the Northern District of California granted the 
defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
because the federal common law claim for public nuisance is barred by 
the political question doctrine, and because the plaintiffs lacked 
standing.218 Nevertheless, the Kivalina litigation is far from over. The 
district court’s decision has been appealed to the Ninth Circuit and will 
be subject to reexamination in light of the plaintiff-friendly outcomes 
from the Second Circuit in American Electric Power and the Fifth 
Circuit in Comer. 
                                                     
212. Id. at 880. 
213. Id. 
214. Id. 
215. Id. at 882. The court meant to say “special solicitude,” but it misspelled the term. The term 
“special solicitude” in the majority’s opinion in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 & n.17 
(2007), is derived from the landmark case, Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907). It 
refers to a state’s special ability to sue on behalf of its citizens to protect the natural resources and 
environmental health and safety of its citizens within its borders. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519–
20. 
216. Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 882 (citing Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519). 
217. Id. 
218. Id. at 883. 
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B. Obstacles to Success After Kivalina and Their Solutions 
The Kivalina litigation’s legacy will endure in many forms for many 
years to come. The basic premise of the claim is that vulnerable 
communities should have a judicial remedy when they are forced to bear 
the brunt of the burden for climate change impacts that give them no 
choice but to become environmental refugees. Public nuisance and, 
perhaps, other common law theories provide a potentially viable avenue 
of recourse for damages to help defray the costs of these tragedies. 
Though viable in theory, public nuisance claims for climate change 
impacts face significant hurdles on the path to becoming 
institutionalized as part of a domestic or international legal framework. 
This Section argues that the political question doctrine and standing are 
the most significant of these potential obstacles, and that these obstacles 
impose appropriate limits on the reach of Kivalina-like plaintiffs in 
future public nuisance litigation.219 
1. Multiple Recent Cases Demonstrate that Climate Justice Plaintiffs 
Can Overcome the Obstacle of the Political Question Doctrine 
A public nuisance suit for climate change impacts like the one at issue 
in Kivalina would likely not be barred by the political question doctrine 
for two basic reasons. First, compensating victims of climate change is 
not textually committed to another branch; and second, assessing 
damages for such impacts fits within the realm of judicial competence 
and courts have “judicially discoverable and manageable standards”220 at 
their disposal to address such claims. 
In addition to the Second Circuit’s decision in American Electric 
Power and the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Comer, two other cases 
arguably open the door for the theory of the case in Kivalina to pass 
muster under the political question doctrine. These cases, Barasich v. 
Columbia Gulf Transmission Co.221 and In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl 
Ether (MTBE) Products Liability Litigation,222 distinguished the political 
                                                     
219. All of the public nuisance claims for climate change impacts to date have been filed in 
federal court. To be viable, these interstate pollution claims are filed under the federal common law 
of interstate pollution, which serves as the basis for federal court jurisdiction in these cases. Relief 
for public nuisance claims may also be viable under state law under the savings clause of the CAA’s 
citizen suit provision, but these suits also must be filed in federal court. See supra note 190 and 
accompanying text. 
220. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
221. 467 F. Supp. 2d 676 (E.D. La. 2006). 
222. 438 F. Supp. 2d 291 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
AbateDTPed.doc (Do Not Delete) 5/17/2010 9:37 AM 
2010] PUBLIC NUISANCE AND CLIMATE CHANGE 227 
 
question doctrine reasoning of the district court in American Electric 
Power. 
In Barasich, residents of southern Louisiana filed suit against oil- and 
gas-producing companies alleging that the companies had damaged the 
barrier marshlands, which in turn contributed to increased flooding and 
damage during Hurricane Katrina.223 The plaintiffs alleged that the 
defendants’ dredging activities interrupted the hydrology of the 
marshlands leading to destruction of plant life, destabilization of the soil, 
and eventual erosion, until the marshlands became open water.224 In 
addition, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants did not maintain their 
canals, which resulted in further damage to the marshlands.225 
The Eastern District of Louisiana did not find the issue to be a 
nonjusticiable political question.226 Applying the six-factor test from 
Baker v. Carr,227 the court held that the first factor was not met because 
“the defendants do not contend, and the Court does not find, that there is 
a textually demonstrable commitment of coastal erosion questions to a 
coordinate political department.”228 The second factor was not met 
because the court followed Fifth Circuit precedent in Gordon v. Texas,229 
which held that “coastal erosion is not an area in which courts are unable 
to determine judicially manageable standards.”230 The court in Gordon 
also made the important distinction that suits for monetary damages 
generally do not invoke the political question doctrine, but suits for 
injunctive relief do.231 The plaintiffs in the Barasich case only sought 
                                                     
223. Barasich, 467 F. Supp. 2d at 678. 
224. Id. at 679. 
225. Id. 
226. Id. at 688. 
227. For a discussion of the Baker v. Carr test, see supra Part II.B.1. 
228. Barasich, 467 F. Supp. 2d at 682. The court recognized that this factor has typically been 
applied to issues involving impeachment and foreign relations. Id. at 681–82; see also Nixon v. 
United States, 506 U.S. 224, 237–38 (1993) (finding a suit by a federal judge challenging his 
impeachment nonjusticiable because there is a constitutional commitment of impeachment 
procedures to the legislative branch); Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1004–05 (1979) (finding a 
suit by members of Congress challenging the President’s power to determine how to terminate a 
treaty with Taiwan nonjusticiable because it touched upon foreign relations, which is textually 
committed to the political branches). 
229. 153 F.3d 190 (5th Cir. 1998). 
230. Barasich, 467 F. Supp. 2d at 684. 
231. Id. at 685 (citing Gordon, 153 F.3d at 195). The court in Gordon noted that “[i]ndeed, as 
compared to injunctive relief, requests for monetary damages are less likely to raise political 
questions. Monetary damages might but typically do not require courts to dictate policy to federal 
agencies, nor do they constitute a form of relief that is not judicially manageable.” Gordon, 153 
F.3d at 195. On the other hand, “requests for injunctive relief can be particularly susceptible to 
justiciability problems, for they have the potential to force one branch of government—the 
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monetary damages, not injunctive relief.232 In addition, the Supreme 
Court has never applied the second factor of Baker v. Carr to private 
party disputes, such as the present case.233 The third factor was not met 
because it only applies where there are no judicially manageable 
standards, but those existed here.234 
The Barasich court distinguished the case before it from American 
Electric Power. First, the plaintiffs in Barasich sought damages and not 
an injunction, as had been the case in American Electric Power.235 The 
court noted that damages are typically judicially manageable remedies 
and that the remedy sought in this case was restoration damages.236 
Furthermore, the court recognized that the nature of the injunction 
sought in American Electric Power, requiring the court to determine 
appropriate emission reduction rates, was essentially legislative, which 
was not at issue in this case.237 Barasich also involved a tort negligence 
claim, which American Electric Power did not, and the court recognized 
that this claim helped distinguish the results of American Electric 
Power. 238 Given the judicially manageable standards of a tort case for an 
issue that fits within the basic parameters of a traditional tort case, the 
court concluded that this case was not precluded as a political question 
under the second Baker factor.239 The court, however, held that the case 
should be dismissed due to plaintiffs’ failure to prove adequate 
                                                     
judiciary—to intrude into the decisionmaking properly the domain of another branch—the 
executive.” Id. at 194. 
232. Barasich, 467 F. Supp. 2d at 685. 
233. Id. at 684. 
234. Id. at 686–87. The court further reasoned that this case is distinguishable because private 
parties employing ordinary tort litigation are not requiring the court to use any standards it has not 
already used to manage tort cases. It quoted the Second Circuit, which stated, “[B]ecause the 
common law of tort provides clear and well-settled rules on which the district court can easily rely, 
this case does not require the court to render a decision in the absence of ‘judicially discoverable 
and manageable standards.’” Id. at 685 (quoting Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 
49 (2d Cir. 1991)). 
235. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 268–69 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), 
vacated, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009). 
236. Barasich, 467 F. Supp. 2d at 685. 
237. Id. at 686. 
238. Id. at 685. 
239. Id. The court reviewed the last three factors of the Baker test as one inquiry. It held that 
these factors did not apply to the present case for two reasons. First, the issues in this case have not 
yet been reviewed by the other branches, so the court would not be disrespecting other branches by 
reviewing a decision they have already addressed. Id. at 687. Second, although the court recognized 
that the government and Congress have taken some actions in response to erosion issues, it held that 
judicial resolution of this issue would not conflict with federal actions because the plaintiffs are 
disputing the defendant’s actions, not the permit process itself. Id. at 688. 
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redressability and causation, not because it involved a political question, 
as in American Electric Power.240 
Another significant case to distinguish the district court’s reasoning in 
American Electric Power is the MTBE products liability litigation.241 In 
that case, several water companies sued numerous gasoline producers 
that were alleged to have used gasoline products containing methyl 
tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) that contaminated groundwater.242 The 
complaint included public nuisance and other tort-related claims, 
alleging that the defendants’ products contaminated groundwater.243 The 
defendants moved to dismiss these claims as nonjusticiable political 
questions under the Baker test, emphasizing the two factors involving 
initial policy determinations (third factor) and lack of respect for another 
already interested branch (fourth factor).244 The court held that the 
plaintiffs’ claims were not precluded by the political question 
doctrine.245  
Given that the Supreme Court had not recently ruled on the third and 
fourth factors of the Baker test, the MTBE court considered relevant 
circuit court precedent246 and distinguished American Electric Power. 
Regarding the third factor, the court disagreed with the defendants’ 
claim that to balance “relevant economic, environmental, energy and 
security interests implicated by plaintiffs’ effort to ban MTBE” would 
require the court to engage in an initial policy determination that should 
be left to the political branches.247 The court noted the difference 
between determining liability and determining policy.248 Because 
Congress had not addressed the issue by banning such additives or 
limiting the liability of producers, the court only needed to address 
                                                     
240. Id. at 695. 
241. In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., 438 F. Supp. 2d 291 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
242. Id. at 293. 
243. Id. 
244. Id. at 299. 
245. Id. at 304. The fact that the court addressed the issues under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) 
distinguishes the case because the 12(b)(6) standard of review is more plaintiff-friendly. The court 
must proceed with the presumption that all factual allegations made are true, assume all inferences 
in the plaintiff’s favor, and the plaintiff need only show that the complaint is legally feasible, 
without having to demonstrate any burden of proof regarding the weight of evidence. Id. at 295. To 
warrant dismissal, the court must find the claim is clearly and “inextricably linked” to a political 
question and must distinguish mere political cases from political questions. Id. If this link is too 
attenuated, the court will avoid finding political questions. Id. 
246. See id. at 297–305. 
247. Id. at 300.  
248. Id.  
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whether the defendants were liable for the harm their products caused.249 
At the time of suit, Congress had not preempted or comprehensively 
regulated this use; therefore, the court determined that allowing tort 
claims would not interfere with a federal agenda.250 The court further 
noted that, even if the use of these additives was federally regulated or 
could foreseeably be banned by Congress in the future, tort claim 
liability is not precluded “absent a congressional injunction prohibiting 
such suits.”251 The court held that congressional “regulation is relevant 
to tort liability,” but it is not dispositive on the issue.252 
The MTBE court also recognized the relevance of the scope and 
nature of the remedy sought.253 In American Electric Power, the 
plaintiffs sought an injunction to cap emissions and for the court to 
determine a specific percentage of annual emissions reduction.254 The 
court in American Electric Power reasoned that such a remedy would 
force the court to make initial policy determinations regarding the 
percentage of emissions reductions, a policy determination more 
appropriately left to Congress.255 In MTBE, however, the plaintiffs 
merely sought to prevent the defendants from “engaging in further 
releases of MTBE,” contending that such public nuisance common law 
tort claims, which provided the court with adequate guidelines, were 
historically within the judiciary’s domain.256 
The MTBE court concluded that the plaintiffs’ tort claims, including 
the public nuisance claim, were not precluded by the political question 
doctrine.257 The court recognized that the issues arose within a political 
context, but absent any contradictory actions or statements from the 
legislature or executive branches, the case did not present a political 
question under the two Baker factors that defendants pled.258 The court 
denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss.259 
                                                     
249. Id. 
250. Id. at 301. 
251. Id. at 300. 
252. Id. at 301. 
253. Id. 
254. Id. (citing Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), 
vacated, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009)). 
255. Id. (citing Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 274). 
256. Id. at 301 (emphasis omitted). 
257. Id. 
258. Id. at 303–04. 
259. Id. at 294–95, 304. 
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Therefore, the decisions in Barasich and MTBE reinforce the Second 
and Fifth Circuits’ political question doctrine reasoning in American 
Electric Power and Comer, and confirm the viability of Kivalina-like 
litigation. Public nuisance suits for climate change impacts like Kivalina 
would likely not be barred by the political question doctrine because 
compensating victims of climate change is not textually committed to 
another branch and because courts have judicially manageable standards 
at their disposal to address such damage claims. 
2. Climate Justice Plaintiffs Who Establish Geographical Nexus Can 
Overcome the Obstacle Posed by the Standing Doctrine 
In Kivalina-like public nuisance litigation, standing is another 
potential obstacle. When considering standing analysis in this context, 
an important issue is whether geographical nexus is necessary to 
establish standing to recover for alleged global environmental injury.260 
Geographical nexus refers to “the connection required to give an 
individual or government a legitimate interest in an environmental 
problem in a given locale.”261 
Several courts have determined that the geographical nexus 
requirement was satisfied and standing established in cases involving 
challenges under various environmental law statutes. In City of Davis v. 
Coleman,262 one of the first cases to address the geographical nexus 
requirement, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a procedural injury from 
an agency’s failure to comply with requirements under the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)263 provided sufficient injury for 
standing purposes, as long as the plaintiff had a “geographical nexus” to 
the disputed conduct such that the continuation of such conduct may 
cause foreseeable harm to the plaintiff.264 
In Coleman, the city alleged that a proposed highway interchange that 
would make a planned industrial development possible may adversely 
affect the quality and quantity of the city water supply. It further asserted 
                                                     
260. See generally Blake R. Bertagna, “Standing” Up for the Environment: The Ability of 
Plaintiffs to Establish Legal Standing to Redress Injuries Caused by Global Warming, 2006 BYU L. 
REV. 415 (arguing that plaintiffs seeking redress for defendants’ contributions to global climate 
change should allege procedural, rather than substantive, injury claims to overcome geographical 
nexus concerns). 
261. Daniel A. Farber, Stretching the Margins: The Geographic Nexus in Environmental Law, 48 
STAN. L. REV. 1247, 1247 (1996). 
262. 521 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1975). 
263. See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370f (2006). 
264. Coleman, 521 F.2d. at 671. 
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that the development would cause an influx of population that would 
frustrate the city’s policy of “controlled growth” and render its planning 
efforts obsolete.265 The court stated that in creating the environmental 
impact statement (EIS) requirement, “Congress intended to create 
procedural rights in people who have a sufficient geographical nexus to 
the site of the challenged project that they could be expected to suffer 
whatever environmental consequences the project may have.”266 The 
court further determined that “[t]he procedural injury implicit in agency 
failure to prepare an EIS . . . is itself a sufficient ‘injury in fact’ to 
support standing.”267 The court concluded that the City of Davis met the 
test in this case because the Federal Highway Administration’s project 
was located between three and four miles south of the city,268 and, 
because of this proximity, the city could be expected to suffer a wide 
variety of environmental consequences that it alleged would result from 
the interchange.269 
In two subsequent procedural injury cases, the scope of viable 
geographical nexus claims enlarged considerably. In Committee to Save 
the Rio Hondo v. Lucero,270 the plaintiffs alleged that their use and 
enjoyment of areas surrounding a ski resort would be harmed by the 
defendant’s failure to comply with NEPA when carrying out a proposed 
expansion of the ski resort for use in summer months.271 The Tenth 
Circuit confirmed that to establish injury in fact, the plaintiff must claim 
a geographical nexus with the area of alleged harm or an actual use of 
the area where the alleged harm occurs.272 Here, the court concluded that 
the plaintiffs, who resided twelve to fifteen miles down the river from 
the ski resort, satisfied the geographical nexus requirement.273 The 
plaintiffs maintained that they had used the waters of the Rio Hondo 
watershed throughout their lifetimes for irrigating, fishing, and 
swimming, and that they intended to continue such use.274 The court 
reasoned that the plaintiffs had a sufficient connection to the area 
because the use of the ski resort caused an increased risk of harm to the 
                                                     
265. Id. 
266. Id. 
267. Id. 
268. Id. at 665. 
269. Id. at 671. 
270. 102 F.3d 445 (10th Cir. 1996). 
271. Id. at 447. 
272. Id. at 449. 
273. Id. at 450. 
274. Id. 
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plaintiffs from the river, which flows downstream from the resort to the 
plaintiffs’ land.275 
The Ninth Circuit similarly concluded that the geographical nexus 
requirement was satisfied in Citizens for Better Forestry v. USDA,276 
which involved a procedural injury claim under NEPA and the 
Endangered Species Act (ESA).277 The plaintiffs alleged they were 
injured by harms to several natural parks throughout the country, which 
the plaintiffs’ members used to observe nature and wildlife.278 The 
plaintiffs asserted that their interests were impaired by the USDA’s and 
U.S. Forest Service’s failure to comply with procedural requirements of 
NEPA and the ESA before promulgating a new national forest 
management policy.279 Although the USDA had prepared an 
Environmental Assessment (EA) and a Finding of No Significant Impact 
(FONSI), the citizens were deprived of the opportunity to comment.280 
In addition, the USDA failed to complete a biological assessment under 
the ESA and did not engage in formal consultation with the Secretary of 
the Interior.281 The court held that the plaintiffs had established an injury 
because they used the particular parks of interest, which established the 
geographical nexus to the alleged harm.282 Furthermore, the Ninth 
Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs need only allege a geographical 
nexus with an area that is subject to an increased risk of harm from the 
defendants’ conduct and need not specify exactly what harm would 
occur within any given national park.283 
Geographical nexus has also been established in standing cases in 
which substantive injuries were alleged. For example, in Friends of the 
Earth v. Laidlaw,284 the plaintiffs lived in the vicinity of the defendant’s 
facility, which discharged various pollutants into a river in violation of 
the CWA.285 The plaintiffs’ members who had expressed concerns in 
                                                     
275. Id. The court distinguished this case from Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 
871 (1990), in that here, the plaintiffs’ land downstream was specified, whereas in National Wildlife 
Federation, the geographical nexus was not established by simply alleging that the plaintiffs had an 
interest somewhere within the vicinity of harm that occurred on a large tract of land. See id. at 451. 
276. 341 F.3d 961 (9th Cir. 2003). 
277. Id. at 965. See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006). 
278. Citizens for Better Forestry, 341 F.3d at 972. 
279. Id. at 970. 
280. Id. 
281. Id. at 967. 
282. Id. at 971. 
283. Id. at 971–72. 
284. 528 U.S. 167 (2000). 
285. Id. at 181–83. 
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affidavits lived one-quarter mile, one-half mile, two miles, twenty miles, 
and forty miles from the defendant’s facility.286 The Supreme Court 
concluded that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged injury in fact by 
asserting that they used the affected area and are persons “for whom the 
aesthetic and recreational values of the area will be lessened” by the 
challenged activity.287 
Similarly, in Covington v. Jefferson County,288 the plaintiffs lived 
across the street from a city landfill and suffered impacts both 
individually and to their property from the landfill’s unsanitary 
operations.289 The plaintiffs faced several risks from the landfill’s 
operation including fires, explosions, vectors, scavengers, and 
groundwater contamination.290 The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs 
were directly affected by, or at a greatly increased risk, of such impacts 
due to their close proximity, which established a concrete risk of harm 
and sufficient injury in fact.291 The court noted that a plaintiff need not 
prove damage has happened or will definitely happen, as long as there is 
an increased probability that the threatened harm will occur.292 
Therefore, to meet the injury-in-fact requirement for standing in their 
citizen suit under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA)293 and the CAA,294 the plaintiffs were not required to show that 
they would prevail on their challenge asserting that the landfill’s 
operation violated these statutes, but only needed to show that the 
conduct they challenged sufficiently injured them.295 In Covington, the 
court concluded that the plaintiffs adequately alleged injury-in-fact when 
they averred that they used the affected area, and that they are persons 
for whom the aesthetic and recreational values of the area would be 
lessened by the challenged activity.296 
                                                     
286. Id. 
287. Id. at 183 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972)). But see Friends of the 
Earth, Inc. v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 95 F.3d 358, 361 (5th Cir. 1996) (requiring plaintiff to 
demonstrate a more specific geographic or causative nexus because an eighteen-mile distance 
between the point of discharge and the area of plaintiff’s use of a waterway was deemed “too large 
to infer causation”). 
288. 358 F.3d 626 (9th Cir. 2004). 
289. Id. at 638. 
290. Id. 
291. Id. 
292. See id. 
293. See Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k (2006). 
294. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006). 
295. Covington, 358 F.3d at 639. 
296. Id. (quoting Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167, 183 (2000)). 
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Geographical nexus analysis for global environmental harms with 
local impacts is the analysis most relevant for purposes of evaluating 
Kivalina-like litigation. The courts’ review of geographical nexus in 
global environmental harm cases also draws on causation concerns. In 
another challenge under the CAA, the plaintiffs in Northwest 
Environmental Defense Center v. Owens Corning Corp.297 alleged that 
the defendant company was violating the CAA by emitting harmful 
ozone-depleting gases without a permit for its facility.298 The plaintiffs, 
who resided, worked, and recreated near the partially completed facility, 
feared future harm to their health and environment.299 The plaintiffs 
alleged that they would suffer direct health impacts from emissions 
entering into the atmosphere from the defendant’s facility, and that the 
local ecosystem with which these individuals constantly interact could 
be damaged.300 
The court in Owens Corning Corp. concluded that the plaintiffs had 
standing to bring the suit.301 While recognizing that global warming is a 
general problem for the entire world, the court determined that the 
injuries that the plaintiffs alleged concerned their locality and had 
already manifested themselves in their vicinity.302 The court further 
noted that the complaint need only establish an individualized injury to 
the plaintiffs.303 The plaintiffs did not need to prove with scientific 
certainty that the defendant’s emissions, and only those emissions, were 
the cause of their apprehensions.304 
Courts have determined that plaintiffs lacked sufficient geographical 
nexus to support standing in several cases; however, these courts so 
concluded on factually distinguishable grounds. The first two of these 
cases illustrate the proposition that “bad facts make bad law,” and are 
easily distinguishable from Kivalina-like litigation scenarios. The 
                                                     
297. 434 F. Supp. 2d 957 (D. Or. 2006). 
298. Id. at 959–60. 
299. Id. at 960–61. 
300. Id. at 965. 
301. Id. at 971. 
302. Id. at 970. 
303. Id. at 967. 
304. Id. Regarding prudential concerns, the defendant argued that the zone of interest would be 
too large because worldwide emissions cannot be monitored, and a worldwide zone of interest is 
unreasonable. Id. at 969. The court determined that the plaintiffs’ claims asserted their own rights 
and that the zone of interest concern was satisfied. Id. Moreover, in response to the defendant’s 
position that the plaintiffs’ allegations constituted a generalized grievance, the court concluded that 
just because an injury is widespread does not mean it is generalized or beyond the court’s authority. 
Id. 
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combination of Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation305 and Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife306 heralded the onset of a new and more restrictive 
era in environmental standing. The plaintiffs in National Wildlife 
Federation alleged that their use and enjoyment of land in a general 
vicinity of large tracts of lands was harmed.307 The Supreme Court 
concluded that this general proximity was not specific enough to 
establish standing.308 
One of the areas alleged as a vicinity of interest, known as the 
“Arizona Strip,” was 5.5 million acres.309 As such, the plaintiffs’ 
proximity to the harm was not established.310 The Supreme Court 
explained that such general conclusions do not meet the geographical 
requirements to survive a motion for summary judgment.311 The Court 
reasoned that “Rule 56(e) is assuredly not satisfied by averments which 
state only that one of respondent’s members uses unspecified portions of 
an immense tract of territory, on some portions of which mining activity 
has occurred or probably will occur by virtue of the governmental 
action.”312 According to the Court, allegations that “presume” missing 
facts are insufficient because, without them, the affidavits would not 
establish the alleged injury.313 Unlike the speculative allegations in 
National Wildlife Federation, the plaintiffs in Kivalina have alleged 
concrete harm—coastal erosion—that is linked to the defendants’ 
                                                     
305. 497 U.S. 871 (1990). 
306. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
307. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. at 887. 
308. Id. at 889. 
309. Id. at 887. 
310. Id. 
311. Id. at 889. 
312. Id. 
313. Id. The Court distinguished its standard of review from the one at issue in United States v. 
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973), noting that the 
standard in SCRAP differed because it involved a motion to dismiss and not a Rule 56 motion for 
summary judgment. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. at 889. Subsequently, in United States 
v. AVX Corp., the First Circuit further qualified the relevance of SCRAP. 962 F.2d 108, 117 (1st Cir. 
1992). The court stated that “it is not enough, at least in the post-Lujan era, that a plaintiff possesses 
some generalized, undifferentiated interest in preserving those resources.” Id. at 118. Rather, as 
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky has concluded, a plaintiff, to secure standing, “must show that he or 
she uses the specific property in question.” Id. (quoting Erwin Chemerinsky, FEDERAL 
JURISDICTION § 2.3.2 (Little, Brown & Co. Supp. 1990)). The AVX court interpreted the 
geographical nexus requirement strictly by suggesting that living within a state is not enough; the 
plaintiffs’ proximity to the alleged harm must be more localized. Id. at 117. In SCRAP, on the other 
hand, the plaintiffs lived in and used land within a 5564 square-mile area that encompassed 
Virginia, Maryland, and West Virginia. Id. 
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contributions to climate change as manifested by sea level rise, which is 
one of the principal impacts of climate change. 
A similarly defective brand of non-specific allegations on an even 
larger environmental scale was at issue in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife. 
This case involved an ESA claim regarding actions taken abroad that the 
plaintiffs claimed affected their ability to enjoy endangered species of 
wildlife that they had observed in foreign countries.314 The Supreme 
Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they did not show 
a particularized and individual injury.315 The Court noted that to assert 
an individual injury, the plaintiff must show more than just a general 
injury to the ecosystem based on conduct far away from the plaintiffs’ 
location.316 An injury is not concrete and particularized enough if it is 
merely a general injury that may affect anyone anywhere on the globe 
who has an interest in observing and studying wildlife.317 Furthermore, a 
special interest in the action is not sufficient to allege injury; the 
plaintiffs’ injury must still be direct.318 The Court also held that “some 
day” intentions to return to the sites where the plaintiffs had observed 
the endangered species in question were not sufficient to satisfy the 
actual or imminent requirement for injury.319 The Court conceded, 
however, that failing to prove a geographical proximity to the harm, 
based on distance alone, would not necessarily defeat an injury claim.320 
The D.C. Circuit reached a similar conclusion on similar non-specific 
allegations in Florida Audubon Society v. Bentsen.321 In that case, the 
plaintiffs opposed a tax change on the gas additive ETBE, claiming that 
the new tax would increase the production of ethanol in their vicinities, 
leading to an increase in agriculture, which in turn would harm the 
environment of the plaintiffs’ agricultural areas.322 The plaintiffs alleged 
                                                     
314. See Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 562–63. 
315. Id. at 563. 
316. Id. 
317. Id. 
318. Id. 
319. Id. at 564. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ additional attempts to show individualized 
injury. The Court found the first attempt, the “ecosystem nexus,” insufficient because the plaintiff 
must prove they actually use the area affected and not simply an area “roughly in the vicinity of” it. 
Id. at 565–66. The plaintiffs’ second attempt, the “animal nexus,” was also found insufficient 
because it would give standing to anyone anywhere in the world who wanted to claim injury. Id. at 
566–67. The last attempt, the “vocational nexus,” was also held insufficient because it would give 
the same general right to sue to everyone with a professional interest, regardless of individualized 
factors. Id. 
320. Id. at 567 n.3. 
321. 94 F.3d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
322. Id. at 666. 
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that this increase in agriculture would affect wildlife in the areas that 
bordered the agricultural developments.323 The D.C. Circuit denied 
standing for this claim, stating that there was insufficient evidence that 
the tax would harm the particular agricultural areas and that, if anything, 
the plaintiffs merely alleged a hypothetical harm that was common to all 
and not specific to the area at issue.324 Consequently, the court 
concluded that plaintiffs did not allege a sufficient geographical nexus 
for the alleged harm.325 
The only case involving geographical nexus that could undermine 
plaintiffs’ ability to establish geographical nexus in Kivalina-like 
litigation is a 2009 case from the D.C. Circuit, Center for Biological 
Diversity v. U.S. Department of the Interior.326 The Center for Biological 
Diversity challenged the Department of the Interior’s (DOI’s) approval 
of a new five-year oil and gas leasing program, which included an 
expansion of previous lease offerings in the Beaufort, Bering, and 
Chukchi Seas off the coast of Alaska.327 Among several claims, the 
plaintiff argued that DOI violated both the Outer Continental Shelf 
Lands Act and NEPA for failing to take into consideration both the 
effects of climate change on outer continental shelf areas and the leasing 
program’s effects on climate change.328 The court distinguished the 
substantive standing claim in this case from the claim at issue in 
Massachusetts v. EPA.329 The court noted that in Massachusetts v. EPA, 
the state was allowed to sue as a sovereign on behalf of its individually 
affected citizens for the impacts of loss of coastal land from sea level 
rise.330 In this case, however, the D.C. Circuit noted that the claim 
alleged climate change impacts in general without any direct and 
personal injury to the citizens of the Village of Point Hope, Alaska.331 
                                                     
323. Id. at 667. 
324. Id. at 668. The Court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that individual corn 
or sugar farmers in these areas would affirmatively respond to the tax credit by significantly 
increasing production. Id. at 667. Instead, the plaintiffs contended that the tax credit would create a 
general risk of serious environmental harm by encouraging farmers throughout the United States, 
and by implication, farmers near the wildlife areas that the plaintiffs visited, to increase production 
in a manner that would increase agricultural pollution, which in turn would damage the wildlife 
areas. Id. 
325. Id. at 668. 
326. 563 F.3d 466 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
327. Id. at 471. 
328. Id. at 471–72. 
329. Id. at 476 (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518–23). 
330. Id. at 476–77. 
331. Id. at 477. The Village of Point Hope, Alaska is a federally recognized tribal government 
whose members use the Chukchi Sea for hunting, fishing, whaling, and gathering. 
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Furthermore, even if the harm were not a general claim, the only climate 
change impacts that were occurring affected property owned by the 
federal government and not Point Hope’s sovereign property.332 Thus, 
even though the tribe’s members use the affected area, the court denied 
Point Hope the opportunity to assert the “special solicitude” exception 
established in Massachusetts v. EPA.333 Thus, the substantive injury 
claim in this case failed for lack of standing because the allegations were 
not individualized and particular, but general to humanity at large. It also 
failed because the court regarded the claim as hypothetical and lacking 
causation.334 
While the court in Center for Biological Diversity arguably reached 
the correct conclusion on the facts before it, the scenario in that case is 
distinguishable from Kivalina-like litigation for climate change impacts. 
The Fifth Circuit in Comer addressed this distinction directly and 
effectively: 
[T]he D.C. Circuit [in Center for Biological Diversity] found 
that the plaintiffs could only speculate that the damages will 
occur only if many different actors . . . all acted in a way that 
would increase global warming to cause damage. Here, the 
plaintiffs, instead, make allegations, taken as true, that a past 
causation link led to their particularized damage—therefore, the 
alleged harms to the plaintiffs’ specific property and persons are 
“traceable” to the Defendants without speculation as to the 
Defendants’ and third parties’ future actions and interactions.335 
In a related vein, the Fifth Circuit in Comer also determined that the 
chain of causation at issue in Comer was “one step shorter than the one 
recognized in Massachusetts”; therefore, the plaintiffs in Comer did not 
need to rely on the special solicitude exception to establish standing.336 
These standing cases demonstrate that public nuisance claims for 
climate change impacts face a challenging but not insurmountable 
obstacle in seeking to comply with the geographical nexus and causation 
requirements for standing. Based on the Owens Corning Corp. and 
Center for Biological Diversity cases discussed above, parties alleging 
claims that are closely analogous to the Kivalina scenario are likely to 
meet standing requirements because of the direct cause and effect 
relationship at issue. Scenarios like Comer have the potential to be 
                                                     
332. Id. 
333. Id. 
334. Id. at 478. 
335. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 863 n.3 (5th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). 
336. Id. at 865 n.5. 
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successful, but will prove more challenging to fulfill the geographical 
nexus and causation requirements. One impact of climate change is a 
mere increased likelihood of a severe storm event such as Hurricane 
Katrina, which in turn caused the devastating impacts that the plaintiffs 
suffered in Comer. By contrast, the increased coastal erosion in 
Kivalina, caused at least in part by climate change, directly caused the 
need to evacuate the village. 
IV. PUBLIC NUISANCE LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
AS A SHORT- AND LONG-TERM SOLUTION FOR THE 
GLOBAL CLIMATE JUSTICE MOVEMENT 
This Part evaluates the lessons learned from public nuisance suits for 
climate change impacts and how such lessons can be adapted for use on 
the international stage. It first examines the opportunities that public 
nuisance suits for climate change impacts offer as a short-term fix and a 
possible foundation for a long-term solution for populations 
disproportionately affected by climate change in the United States and 
throughout the world. It then provides some observations about the 
synergies between these suits and the evolution of citizen suits under 
U.S. environmental law. 
A. Public Nuisance Suits as Viable Relief for the Present and Future 
The crisis in the Native Village of Kivalina and situations like it 
throughout the world demand both a short-term remedy and a long-term 
solution. These desperate situations require an urgent and creative legal 
response because traditional international climate change treaty 
negotiations cannot develop and implement a viable remedy quickly 
enough. Such responses take years, if not decades, to evolve.  
In the meantime, engaging the judiciary to secure common law relief 
through remedies such as public nuisance litigation may be a viable 
short-term remedy in that it is the most immediate way to redress the 
harm for victims in the United States. However, it is a limited and 
unreliable solution on its own terms because it is confined to case-by-
case assessments of whether such a remedy exists, and it must overcome 
challenging jurisdictional obstacles such as the political question 
doctrine337 and standing338 for such claims to be heard. The publicity 
                                                     
337. For a discussion of the political question doctrine challenges that climate justice plaintiffs 
face, see supra Part III.B.1. 
338. For a discussion of the standing doctrine challenges that climate justice plaintiffs face, see 
supra Part III.B.2. 
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from and potential victories in public nuisance suits can, in the long 
term, help lay a foundation for a future climate justice framework. Such 
an opportunity could mirror and capitalize on the evolution of citizen 
suits under federal environmental laws by institutionalizing a private 
right to be free from climate change impacts that threaten the 
sustainability of vulnerable communities in a post-Kyoto world. 
1. Short-Term Relief 
Important conditions and limitations need to be in place for future 
public nuisance suits for climate change impacts to be successful. First, 
Article III standing jurisprudence demands that only parties that meet 
injury, causation, and redressability requirements are eligible to seek the 
relief from the courts. Second, the suits must seek relief that the courts 
can grant. The political question doctrine can impose appropriate limits 
on the justiciability of these claims. Litigants should not ask courts to 
play the role of Congress, even when Congress has not responded to 
critical issues of national concern in a timely manner. For public 
nuisance cases to be justiciable, there must be an allegation of individual 
harm for which the court can fashion a remedy. Asking the court to 
determine an emission cap for power plants throughout the nation is not 
an appropriate theory of relief in a public nuisance case because such a 
remedy must be established and implemented in the legislative and 
executive branches through climate treaty negotiations and domestic 
implementing legislation.339 Although the Second Circuit accepted this 
theory of relief in American Electric Power, it is very unlikely that the 
Supreme Court would embrace such a view if it grants review in the 
case. 
Public nuisance cases for climate change impacts also need to allege 
viable causal connections between the defendants’ acts or omissions and 
the alleged victims’ injuries. The allegations in Comer represent the 
outer limits of a potentially viable claim on causation grounds. As the 
Fifth Circuit noted, the Comer causation scenario is no more attenuated 
than the causal connection that was determined to be valid in 
Massachusetts v. EPA on special solicitude standing grounds.340 
                                                     
339. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (holding courts may refrain from hearing 
disputes on political question grounds if there is “a textually demonstrable constitutional 
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department”). 
340. The Fifth Circuit in Comer held that it did not matter if the defendants were merely a few of 
many sources to cause harm to the plaintiffs. 585 F.3d at 865. To satisfy the “fairly traceable” 
element of standing, the court concluded that the relevant test is whether “the pollutant causes or 
contributes to the kinds of injuries alleged by the plaintiffs.” Id. at 866 (quoting Sierra Club v. 
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Although the Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiffs’ case could proceed, 
this scenario, like American Electric Power, is likely to fail if it reaches 
the Supreme Court. 
The best source of hope is the “just right” factual circumstances 
reflected in the Kivalina scenario. While alleging proper injury in fact is 
often the most significant hurdle in environmental standing cases, the 
biggest potential standing hurdle in public nuisance claims for climate 
change impacts is causation. Even though the “fairly traceable” standard 
for causation is more plaintiff-friendly than the proximate causation 
requirement in negligence claims, the fairly traceable standard 
nevertheless can be a daunting hurdle in the context of global 
environmental harms. The causal connection in Kivalina, albeit broad, is 
tighter than what the Fifth Circuit approved in Comer. More importantly, 
the theory of relief in Kivalina is the best available in this sequence of 
public nuisance cases because individual victims of the impacts have 
been identified. 
Therefore, the American Electric Power-Comer-Kivalina trilogy 
represents a “good-better-best” spectrum of refinement in public 
nuisance cases for climate change impacts. The theory of relief in 
American Electric Power was effective as an awareness-raising 
mechanism to goad the federal government into responding to the 
climate change problem with an effective federal system of regulation; 
however, it was not a viable theory upon which to base future remedies 
in public nuisance cases.341 The Comer case also is effective as a goad 
for future government regulation of climate change impacts, but it too is 
not an ideal theory of relief for future public nuisance cases because it is 
potentially subject to abuse as a means to scapegoat the regulated 
community by extracting piecemeal relief from those entities for a 
regulatory failure that rests primarily with the federal government.342 
However, the failure of the other common law claims in Comer 
underscores the potential ongoing validity of the public nuisance theory 
in that case. The Fifth Circuit in Comer held that the other common law 
claims in the case—unjust enrichment, civil conspiracy, and fraudulent 
misrepresentation—must be dismissed on prudential standing grounds as 
nonjusticiable grievances common to all of society.343 Unlike the public 
nuisance claim in Comer, these other common law claims sought relief 
                                                     
Cedar Point Oil Co., 73 F.3d 546, 557 (5th Cir. 1996)). 
341. For a discussion of the American Electric Power case, see supra Part II.B.1. 
342. For a discussion of the Comer case, see supra Part II.B.3. 
343. Comer, 585 F.3d at 867–68. 
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for the failure of the government to properly regulate the emissions.344 
While those concerns are valid, they are more properly addressed by the 
legislative and executive branches. In contrast, the public nuisance claim 
is a strong basis for such suits because it is valid on both standing and 
political question grounds. 
The Kivalina litigation builds on the viability of public nuisance 
theory from Comer in seeking relief for identified victims of cultural 
genocide in connection with climate change impacts. The public 
nuisance framework provides a useful structure for an individual, 
reactive, short-term remedy. The Native Village of Kivalina exemplifies 
the proper type of plaintiff for this kind of action. The nature and degree 
of harm to it is such that appropriate judicial parameters on the viability 
of future claims can be imposed because “cultural genocide” is a very 
difficult standard to meet. Public nuisance claims can succeed where 
disparate impact litigation failed in the environmental justice context. 
Like environmental justice, such claims can promote positive outcomes 
through enhanced awareness and proactive measures to protect such 
disproportionately affected communities. Unlike environmental justice 
litigation, however, climate justice litigation offers victims the 
possibility of sustaining their claims in the courts and obtaining the relief 
they deserve. 
Although public nuisance litigation offers a viable mechanism 
through which human rights impacts from climate change can be 
remedied, this common law avenue of relief can be abused.345 Especially 
at a time when the U.S. government has been slow to implement a 
federal response to climate change, the regulated community is 
especially vulnerable to public nuisance suits. Such suits run the risk of 
targeting the regulated entities as “scapegoats” of an impatient public’s 
desire for tangible relief in addressing the climate change problem. 
Therefore, this approach is problematic over the long term and should be 
replaced with a top-down response to the climate change problem that 
can incorporate human rights concerns at both the domestic and 
international levels. 
                                                     
344. Id. 
345. See generally Randall S. Abate, Automobile Emissions and Climate Change Impacts: 
Employing Public Nuisance Doctrine as Part of a “Global Warming Solution” in California, 40 
CONN. L. REV. 591, 624–29 (2008) (discussing possible abuses of public nuisance litigation in 
environmental law matters); Faulk & Gray, supra note 14 (discussing lead paint litigation as an 
example of abuse of public nuisance suits). It is likely that there will be a similar evolution with 
respect to climate justice rights and remedies. 
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2. Building a Long-Term Framework 
Public nuisance litigation is a useful mechanism to spur 
“institutionalized” relief in the form of a federal statutory or treaty-based 
remedy in the near future for the victims of climate change impacts. The 
evolution of citizen enforcement of federal environmental laws is 
instructive in this regard. Prior to the 1970s, recovering for harm to 
shared resources such as mountains, rivers, and oceans was the sole 
province of the government. Concerned citizens could only urge their 
elected officials to respond to these crises but were otherwise powerless 
to respond directly. Common law remedies were the only legal recourse 
that these concerned citizens could turn to for relief. These legal theories 
were an extremely limited and largely ineffective means of seeking the 
broad-based relief for environmental harms that plaintiffs sought. 
Nevertheless, the creative use of common law remedies was an 
important precursor to raise awareness of the need for comprehensive 
federal and state statutory-based schemes to address these problems, and 
the need to allow citizens to play meaningful roles in enforcing new 
legislative schemes through citizen suit provisions.346 
A similar recognition and evolution could occur through the creative 
use of public nuisance litigation to seek recovery for climate change 
impacts. The victims are clearly identifiable (i.e., the people who are 
forced to move from their communities), which is similar to the way in 
which the exploited resources were the clearly identified “victims” in the 
1970s. This litigation would help raise awareness of the need for a 
comprehensive federal response, which would ultimately help the 
victims of climate change impacts. Eliminating the prudential 
considerations component for standing in citizen suit provisions under 
federal environmental laws has enhanced access to the courts for 
aggrieved plaintiffs to recover for environmental harm, and this 
progression of public nuisance suits could achieve a similar result 
here.347 
Like the explosion of federal environmental law in the United States 
in the 1970s and 1980s, the use of public nuisance suits and other 
common law remedies for climate change impacts in the United States 
                                                     
346.  “Environmental citizen suits seemed farfetched in the early 1970s, but by the early 1980s, 
they had become institutionalized.” Randall S. Abate, Kyoto or Not, Here We Come: The Promise 
and Perils of the Piecemeal Approach to Climate Change Regulation in the United States, 15 
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 370, 399 (2006) (citing MICHAEL D. AXLINE, ENVIRONMENTAL 
CITIZEN SUITS 1-9, 1-10 (1991)). 
347. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1035, 1039 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that 
Congress may eliminate the prudential requirements of standing by legislation). 
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could provide valuable guidance to the international community. For 
example, the Australian counterpart to the Kivalina litigation involves 
the Torres Straits Islanders. Australia is the sixteenth largest and fourth 
highest per capita greenhouse gas emitter.348 In addition to its current 
and future climate change treaty commitments, common law litigation 
will be a potentially effective means to apply the legal, political, and 
moral pressure necessary to ensure the current Australian government 
will do all that is possible to address the problem.349 
To date, the legal means for addressing such issues in Australia have 
been through judicial and merits review in administrative law.350 A tort 
complaint based in negligence or nuisance could be more effective and 
would be highly relevant to the circumstances of the Torres Straits; 
however, asserting a tort claim against the government is difficult on 
causation grounds.351 In the alternative, some countries have sought to 
apply international law in global warming cases, claiming that 
governments have failed to prevent transboundary harm.352 
Unfortunately, the Torres Strait Islanders would face a daunting 
challenge in proving standing, as the International Court of Justice is 
restricted to states, and Australia’s courts cannot force a foreign 
government to comply with Australia’s international obligations.353 
A more realistic option for the Torres Strait Islanders would be to 
make an individual complaint to the United Nations Human Rights 
Commission (HRC). The HRC was established in 1947 to protect human 
rights.354 It does not use judicial proceedings in human rights cases, but 
instead focuses on raising public awareness and implementing programs 
to address these issues in each of its member states.355 Nevertheless, a 
favorable outcome at the HRC may put the necessary pressure on future 
governmental policy decisions.356 Fortunately, human rights bodies such 
                                                     
348. See supra Part I. 
349. See supra Part III.B. 
350. See supra Part III.B. 
351. See supra Part III.B. 
352. Kalinga Seneviratne, Tiny Tuvalu Steps up Threat to Sue Australia, U.S., INTER PRESS 
SERVICE, Sept. 5, 2002, http://www.commondreams.org/headlines02/0905-02.htm. 
353. Press Release, International Commission of Jurists: Australian Section, ICJ Australia 
Opposes New Counter-Terrorism Laws 1 (Oct. 7, 2005), available at http://www.unhcr.org/ 
refworld/country,,ICJURISTS,,AUS,,48a3f02ed,0.html. 
354. Caroline Dommen, How Human Rights Norms Can Contribute to Environmental Protection: 
Some Practical Possibilities Within the United Nations System, in LINKING HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
THE ENVIRONMENT 105, 106 (Romina Picolotti & Jorge Daniel Taillant eds., 2003). 
355. Id. at 106. 
356. The Inuit advanced a similar theory in their petition against the United States before the 
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as the HRC have developed a link between human rights and the 
environment to allow for such an inquiry, particularly for indigenous 
peoples adversely affected by environmentally harmful activities.357 The 
HRC has recognized rights to life, freedom of residence, and movement; 
the enjoyment of culture; the protection of privacy, family, and the 
home; property; and health.358 In a similar case involving the Inuit, 
alleged infringement of these rights was also asserted.359 
A Torres Straits complaint to the HRC would have to challenge 
Australia’s compliance with its obligations under the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).360 The plaintiffs could 
assert that the Covenant adopted by the government to protect citizens 
requires the government to adopt measures to prevent climate change.361 
The complaint would have to assert that Australia’s current greenhouse 
gas emission levels are not in compliance with the Kyoto Protocol and 
post-Kyoto negotiations.362 A complaint in Australian national courts 
would have to challenge the appropriateness of the government’s 
emission reduction targets, and whether the government has adopted 
adequate policies to ensure those targets will be met in a timely 
manner.363 Domestic remedies must be exhausted prior to application to 
the human rights body.364 However, since this type of problem exists on 
an international level, this step can be accomplished easily.365 
Such a complaint must also address causation issues. First, the 
complaint must show that anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions are 
responsible for global warming.366 Second, the specific impacts of 
climate change alleged to violate islanders’ ICCPR rights must be 
attributed to anthropogenic greenhouse gases. Third, and most difficult, 
the harm to the islanders’ ICCPR rights must be attributed to the acts or 
omissions of the Australian Government. Finally, standing must be 
addressed. So long as an applicant is considered a “victim,” he or she 
                                                     
Inter-American Human Right Commission. See Emily Gertz, Inuit Fight Climate Change with 
Human-Rights Claim Against U.S., GRIST, July 26, 2005, http://www.grist.org/article/gertz-inuit. 
357. Id. 
358. Id.; Seneviratne, supra note 352. 
359. Gertz, supra note 356. 
360. Id. 
361. Id. 
362. Id. 
363. Id. 
364. Id. 
365. Id. 
366. Id. 
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will have standing.367 Therefore, the complaint should allege actual 
injury to the islanders.368 
The Kivalina litigation addresses all of these important questions and 
could provide a valuable reference point from which to spread the 
viability of this theory of relief throughout the international community. 
The case involves two essential elements for success: (1) identified 
victims who have suffered direct harm from climate change impacts; and 
(2) the degree of harm suffered constitutes cultural genocide because the 
need to relocate the population fundamentally alters the subsistence 
lifestyle of the community. Climate justice relief need not be limited to 
such extreme factual scenarios; however, compelling cases are necessary 
to establish precedent in the courts that can later be institutionalized in 
legislation. 
The success of a small number of these suits under these limited 
circumstances could help the climate justice field grow by replicating the 
evolution of citizen suits under federal environmental law. The 
foundation for citizen suits under federal environmental laws was a 
series of successful, albeit piecemeal and uncoordinated, lawsuits 
applying creative common law theories. The recognition of the need for 
meaningful public participation and enhanced governmental and private 
sector environmental accountability prompted Congress to respond with 
a comprehensive framework of citizen suit provisions in federal 
environmental laws. Similarly, climate justice claims that once were 
only viable in the courts on a piecemeal basis can become more 
“institutionalized” and likely to succeed when authorized pursuant to a 
federal legislative scheme. Once a federal regulatory system is in place, 
however, public nuisance suits for climate change impacts should remain 
available as a viable gap-filler remedy for limited and extreme scenarios 
like the Kivalina plaintiffs. This approach is transferable to the 
international context as part of a post-Kyoto framework as the 
international community moves forward from Copenhagen. 
B. Incorporating Climate Justice Principles into the Post-Kyoto 
Regime 
As Kivalina-like litigation theories gain support in the courts in the 
United States, Australia and elsewhere, they may prompt nations to 
develop legislation recognizing such human rights-based protections for 
climate change impacts. The next step would be to integrate such a 
                                                     
367. Id. 
368. Id. 
AbateDTPed.doc (Do Not Delete) 5/17/2010 9:37 AM 
248 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:197 
 
theory at the international level in a treaty or pre-treaty agreement, such 
as the recent Copenhagen Accord.369 A similar progression occurred in 
the context of environmental impact assessment, which took hold in the 
United States in the late 1960s370 and was subsequently integrated into 
international environmental law treaties in the ensuing decades.371 
Developing countries’ interests are now commanding more attention 
than ever before in international climate change negotiations.372 The 
need for climate justice provisions as part of a post-Kyoto regime is 
likely to gain a similar stronghold with possible victories at the domestic 
level in cases like Kivalina and the Torres Strait Islanders. One goal of 
the climate justice movement is that the cultural genocide these 
victimized populations are facing or may face in the immediate future 
should begin to trigger domestic and international human rights 
protections.373 
Some of the publicity regarding the need for climate justice 
provisions has already taken hold in international climate diplomacy. In 
December 2009, at the Fifteenth Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol in Copenhagen, climate justice concerns were considered as 
part of the negotiation for the provisions of the Copenhagen Accord. For 
example, Article 1 of the Accord provides, “We recognize the critical 
impacts of climate change and the potential impacts of response 
measures on countries particularly vulnerable to its adverse effects and 
stress the need to establish a comprehensive adaptation programme 
including international support.”374 The Accord also establishes specific 
mechanisms to promote climate change adaptation assistance to 
vulnerable populations. For example, Article 6 recognizes the crucial 
role of reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation 
(REDD) to “enable the mobilization of financial resources from 
developed countries” to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions.375 In 
                                                     
369. Copenhagen Accord, supra note 4.  
370. See National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370f (2006). 
371. See DINAH SHELTON & ALEXANDRE KISS, JUDICIAL HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
38 (2005). 
372. For example, seven of the twelve articles of the Copenhagen Accord address the role of 
developing nations or the adaptation needs of populations most vulnerable to climate change. See 
Copenhagen Accord, supra note 4, arts. 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 10.  
373. See generally Chukwumerije Okereke & Heike Schroeder, How Can Justice, Development, 
and Climate Change Mitigation Be Reconciled for Developing Countries in a Post-Kyoto 
Settlement?, 1 CLIMATE & DEV. 10 (2009); Mark Stallworthy, Environmental Justice Imperatives 
for an Era of Climate Change, 36 J. L. & SOC’Y 55 (2009). 
374. See Copenhagen Accord, supra note 4, art. 1. 
375. See Copenhagen Accord, supra note 4, art. 6. For a critique of the adequacy of the REDD 
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addition, Article 8 calls for thirty billion dollars for the period 2010–
2012 in adaptation funding from the developed countries to the “most 
vulnerable developing countries, such as the least developed countries, 
small island developing States and Africa.”376 Article 8 further calls for 
100 billion dollars a year by 2020 to address developing countries’ 
efforts to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions.377 
But Copenhagen was a disappointment to many who sought stronger 
protections for vulnerable populations.378 First, the Accord is only a 
political agreement—the hope to negotiate a binding treaty text at 
Copenhagen was abandoned as impossible prior to the start of the 
meeting.379 The international community now seeks to negotiate such a 
binding text at the Sixteenth Conference of the Parties (COP 16) in 
Mexico City in 2010. Second, the negotiations were highly contentious, 
largely because the developing countries were dissatisfied with the 
mitigation and adaptation proposals that the developed countries were 
offering.380 Finally, the Accord’s final language lacked any reference to 
“human rights” and existing human rights obligations set forth in other 
international treaties and instruments.381 For a post-Kyoto treaty to fully 
respond to the climate-change-adaptation era of the present, a marriage 
of international environmental law and international human rights must 
occur in that treaty’s text.382 Anything less would further victimize 
vulnerable populations who lie in the path of devastating climate change 
impacts. 
Despite its shortcomings, the Copenhagen Accord reflects an 
important paradigm shift in the international community’s approach to 
                                                     
language in the Copenhagen Accord, see REDD May Yet Survive Copenhagen Failures, 
CARBONPOSITIVE.NET, Dec. 21, 2009, http://www.carbonpositive.net/viewarticle.aspx 
?articleID=1786, and see also Chris Lang, What Came out of Copenhagen on REDD?, Dec. 22, 
2009, http://www.redd-monitor.org/2009/12/22/what-came-out-of-copenhagen-on-redd/. 
376. See Copenhagen Accord, supra note 4, art. 8. 
377. Id. 
378. See Media Release, Inuit Tapirit Kanatami, Copenhagen Accord Excludes Inuit but Contains 
Promise of Hope, (Dec. 21, 2009), http://www.itk.ca/media-centre/media-releases/copenhagen-
accord-excludes-inuit-contains-promise-hope. 
379. See Suzanne Goldenberg & John Vidal, US Scales Down Hopes of Global Climate Change 
Treaty in Copenhagen, GUARDIAN, Nov. 4, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
environment/2009/nov/04/us-climate-change-copenhagen-treaty. 
380. See Mohammed Abdul Baten, Whither Agreements?, DAILY STAR, Nov. 7, 2009, 
http://www.thedailystar.net/story.php?nid=112961. 
381. See generally Copenhagen Accord, supra note 4. 
382. See generally Marc Limon, Human Rights and Climate Change: Constructing a Case for 
Political Action, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 439 (2009) (discussing UN Human Rights Council 
Resolution 7/23, which recognizes that climate change has human rights implications). 
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climate change as compared to the existing approach in the Kyoto 
Protocol. While climate change mitigation strategies remain important, 
they are no longer the exclusive focus of international climate change 
regulation. The text of the Copenhagen Accord is laced with urgency 
regarding the need to implement meaningful climate change adaptation 
measures for vulnerable populations.383 
But the Copenhagen Accord is only a small step forward. The climate 
justice field, both domestically and internationally, needs to build on the 
progress from Copenhagen and develop action mechanisms and 
affirmative rights for these vulnerable populations to ensure that their 
interests are given top priority as the international community confronts 
the daunting challenges posed by climate change in the decades to come. 
Formally recognizing the need for action is an indispensable first step. 
But the devil is in the details and the needs of vulnerable populations 
must come first in moving forward. Human rights impact assessments384 
and actionable individual rights as part of a post-Kyoto regime on 
climate change are examples of a new, human-centered strategy to 
combat international environmental problems. Treaty-based protections 
addressing climate change can no longer focus exclusively on state 
sovereignty and protection of natural resources. The focus now must 
shift to ensure protection of vulnerable populations affected by climate 
change. 
Perhaps the most shocking illustration of this need for enhanced 
protections for vulnerable populations is in the Maldives, a country that 
faces certain inundation from sea level rise within decades unless drastic 
mitigation and adaptation measures are undertaken very soon. This crisis 
                                                     
383. See, e.g., Copenhagen Accord, supra note 4, art. 1 (“We recognize the critical impacts of 
climate change and the potential impacts of response measures on countries particularly vulnerable 
to its adverse effects and stress the need to establish a comprehensive adaptation programme 
including international support.”); id. art. 3 (“Enhanced action and international cooperation on 
adaptation is urgently required to ensure the implementation of the Convention by enabling and 
supporting the implementation of adaptation actions aimed at reducing vulnerability and building 
resilience in developing countries . . . . ”). 
384. Like an environmental impact assessment under NEPA, a human rights impact assessment is 
a “proactive procedural mechanism that evaluates human rights threats posed by climate change 
impacts before permanent adverse impacts are experienced.” Randall S. Abate, Climate Change, the 
United States, and the Impacts of Arctic Melting: A Case Study in the Need for Enforceable 
International Environmental Human Rights, 26A STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 71 (2007). This mechanism 
“seeks to prevent abuses, improve policy, increase corporate accountability, and ultimately to 
increase knowledge of and respect for human rights.” Id. (citing Diana Bronson, Coordinator, 
Globalisation and Human Rights, Presentation to the Parliamentary Subcommittee on Human 
Rights and International Development and Canadian Investment: Human Rights as Due Diligence 
(June 1, 2005) available at http://:www.dd-rd.ca/site/what-we-do/index/.php?subsection=documents 
&lang=en&id=1610). 
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is compellingly conveyed through the eloquent words of the President of 
the Maldives, Mohamed Nasheed, in his inaugural address to the 
“Climate Vulnerable Forum” meeting on November 9, 2009.385 
We gather in this hall today, as some of the most climate-
vulnerable nations on Earth. 
We are vulnerable because climate change threatens to hit us 
first; and hit us hardest. 
And we are vulnerable because we have modest means with 
which to protect ourselves from the coming disaster. 
We are a diverse group of countries. 
But we share one common enemy. 
For us, climate change is no distant or abstract threat; but a clear 
and present danger to our survival. 
*** 
We are the frontline states in the climate change battle. 
*** 
So what can we do about it? 
*** 
Members of the G8 rich countries have pledged to halt 
temperature rises to two degrees Celsius. 
Yet they have refused to commit to the carbon targets, which 
would deliver even this modest goal. 
*** 
At two degrees my country would not survive. 
As a president I cannot accept this. 
*** 
I refuse to believe that it is too late. . . 
Copenhagen is our date with destiny.386 
If the Copenhagen Accord represents the outcome of these nations’ 
“date with destiny,” there is little hope for these nations’ survival in the 
coming decades. These “frontline” nations must press for more 
comprehensive and aggressive mechanisms to authorize climate justice 
relief in both domestic and internationals law instruments and forums. 
                                                     
385. For a compelling account of the desperate situation that the Maldives now confronts in the 
face of rising sea levels caused by climate change, see Nicholas Schmidle, Wanted: A New Home 
for My Country, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, May 10, 2009, at 38. 
386. Mohamed Nasheed, President of the Maldives, Inaugural Address to the Climate Vulnerable 
Forum (Nov. 9, 2009), available at http://bdpollution.blogspot.com/2009/11/climate-vulnerable-
forum-maldives.html. 
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CONCLUSION 
Regardless of the ultimate outcomes in the public nuisance cases for 
climate change impacts in U.S. federal courts, this litigation strategy has 
been an enormous step forward in the climate justice movement. It has 
drawn attention to vulnerable populations that have been victimized by 
climate change impacts and it has underscored the urgent need for a 
viable remedy. These cases were well-timed in that each drew attention 
to these issues at a critical juncture in the international diplomacy on 
climate change law and policy in the negotiations leading up to 
Copenhagen. Developing nations’ need for mitigation and adaptation 
measures have taken center stage in the post-Kyoto era, and negotiating 
a viable system of compensation for victims of climate change impacts 
will be an indispensable component of these negotiations in the years 
ahead. Of course, the nature and degree of these remedies will continue 
to be tested in domestic courts and in international negotiation sessions. 
Ken Alex, Supervising Deputy Attorney General for the State of 
California and counsel for the plaintiffs in California v. General Motors 
Corp., has faith in the promise of public nuisance and other common law 
remedies to effect change and promote justice for victims of 
environmental problems. He writes: 
But in many ways, this environmental challenge is no different 
from the clouds of ‘sulphurous acid gas’ streaming from the 
stacks of Tennessee copper companies into Georgia a century 
ago, where the federal common law rose to protect the interests 
of the harmed state. The genius of environmental common law 
is its ability to address new pollution problems using long-
established principles validated by decades of judicial precedent 
to effect sometimes profound changes. The challenge for 
attorneys handling today’s innovative cases is how to best use 
those common law tools to reach beyond the constraints of 
current politics to a new era of responsibility and hope.387 
The Kivalina case, and a narrow class of future cases like it, could be the 
bridge toward an era of increased hope for the victims of climate change 
impacts and a transition toward increased responsibility for the public 
and private entities that are principally responsible for those harms. 
 
 
                                                     
387. Kenneth P. Alex, California’s Global Warming Lawsuit: The Case for Damages, in 
CREATIVE COMMON LAW STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT 165, 171 (Clifford 
Rechtschaffen & Denise Antolini, eds., 2007) (citations omitted). 
